Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns : the power of the anti-EU side by Atikcan, Ece Özlem
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Atikcan, Ece Ozlem. (2017) Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns : the power of the 
anti-EU side. European Journal of Political Research.  
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88993   
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
"This is the peer reviewed version of the following article Atikcan, Ece Ozlem. (2017) Agenda 
control in EU referendum campaigns : the power of the anti-EU side. European Journal of 
Political Research., which has been published in final form at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12217 . This article may be used for non-commercial 
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
Agenda	Control	in	EU	Referendum	Campaigns:	
The	Power	of	the	Anti-EU	Side	
	
Ece	Özlem	ATIKCAN,	Ph.D.	
Assistant	Professor	in	Comparative	Politics	
Politics	and	International	Studies	
University	of	Warwick	
	
	
Biographical	note	
Ece	Özlem	Atikcan	is	an	Assistant	Professor	at	the	Department	of	Politics	and	International	Studies,	at	
the	University	of	Warwick,	in	the	UK.	Based	on	over	180	in-depth	interviews	with	campaigners,	media	
content	analyses	and	public	opinion	data,	she	studies	EU	referendum	campaigns	to	understand	the	
impact	of	campaign	argumentation	on	public	opinion.	Her	work	has	appeared	in	Journal	of	Common	
Market	Studies,	Journal	of	European	Integration,	and	as	a	book	with	Cambridge	University	Press.	
	
Abstract		
European	 Union	 (EU)	 referendums	 provide	 unique	 opportunities	 to	 study	 voters’	 attitudes	 toward	 a	
distant	 level	 of	 governance.	 Scholars	 have	 long	 tried	 to	 understand	 whether	 EU	 referendum	 results	
reflect	domestic	(dis)satisfaction	with	the	incumbent	governments	or	actual	attitudes	toward	the	Union.	
Finding	evidence	 supporting	both	domestic	and	European	 factors,	 the	 recent	 focus	has	 thus	 turned	 to	
referendum	campaigns.	Recent	studies	emphasize	the	importance	of	the	information	provided	to	voters	
during	 these	 campaigns	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	 how	 domestic	 or	 European	 issues	 become	 salient	 in	 the	
minds	 of	 voters.	 These	 studies	 nonetheless	 overlook	 the	 asymmetrical	 political	 advantage	 in	 such	
campaigns.	The	broader	literature	on	referendums	and	public	opinion	suggest	that	in	a	referendum	the	
No	 side	 typically	 has	 the	 advantage	 since	 it	 can	 boost	 the	 public’s	 fears	 by	 linking	 the	 proposal	 to	
unpopular	 issues.	 This	 article	 explores	 whether	 this	 dynamic	 applies	 to	 EU	 treaty	 ratification	
referendums.	Does	the	anti-EU	treaty	campaign	have	more	advantage	than	the	pro-EU	treaty	campaign	
in	 these	 referendums?	 In	 this	 article,	 I	 analyse	 campaign	 strategies	 in	 11	 EU	 treaty	 ratification	
referendums,	 which	 provide	 a	 clear	 juxtaposition	 between	 pro-treaty	 (Yes)	 and	 anti-treaty	 (No)	
campaigns.	 Based	 on	 140	 interviews	 with	 campaigners	 in	 11	 referendums,	 a	 series	 of	 indicators	 on	
political	setting	and	campaign	characteristics,	as	well	as	an	 in-depth	case	study	of	 the	2012	 Irish	Fiscal	
Compact	referendum,	I	find	that	the	anti-treaty	side	indeed	holds	the	advantage	if	it	engages	the	debate.	
Nonetheless,	the	findings	also	show	that	this	advantage	is	not	unconditional.	The	underlying	mechanism	
rests	 on	 the	multidimensionality	 of	 the	 issue.	 The	 extent	 to	which	 the	 referendum	 debate	 includes	 a	
large	 variety	 of	 No	 campaign	 arguments	 correlates	 strongly	 with	 the	 campaigners’	 perceived	
advantage/disadvantage,	and	the	referendum	results.	When	the	No	side’s	arguments	are	limited	(either	
through	 a	 single-issue	 treaty	 or	 guarantees	 from	 the	 EU),	 this	 provides	 the	 Yes	 side	 with	 a	 ‘cleaner’	
agenda	 to	work	with.	 Importantly,	 the	detailed	data	demonstrate	 that	 the	availability	of	 arguments	 is	
important	 for	 the	Yes	side	as	well.	They	 tend	 to	have	 the	most	advantage	when	they	can	 tap	 into	 the	
economic	costs	of	an	anti-EU	vote.		This	analysis	has	implications	for	other	kinds	of	EU	referendums	such	
as	the	Brexit	case,	non-EU	referendums	such	as	independence	referendums,	and	the	future	of	European	
integration.	
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Since	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 European	 integration	 has	 been	 the	 most	 frequent	 subject	 matter	 for	
referendums	 (Closa,	 2007;	 de	 Vreese,	 2004).	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 referendums	 provide	 a	 unique	
opportunity	to	study	voters’	attitudes	toward	a	distant	 level	of	governance.	Scholars	have	long	tried	to	
understand	 whether	 EU	 referendum	 results	 reflect	 domestic	 (dis)satisfaction	 with	 the	 incumbent	
governments	(Franklin,	2002;	Reif	&	Schmitt,	1980)	or	actual	attitudes	toward	the	EU	(Garry,	Marsh,	&	
Sinnott,	 2005;	 Siune,	 Svensson,	 &	 Tonsgaard,	 1994).	 Finding	 evidence	 supporting	 both	 domestic	 and	
European	 factors	 (e.g.	Aarts	&	 van	der	Kolk,	 2006;	Brouard	&	Tiberj,	 2006),	 the	 recent	 focus	has	 thus	
turned	 to	 referendum	 campaigns.	 More	 specifically,	 scholars	 emphasize	 the	 importance	 of	 the	
information	provided	to	voters	during	 these	campaigns	 in	order	 to	analyse	how	domestic	or	European	
issues	 become	 salient	 in	 the	minds	 of	 voters	 (e.g.	 Elkink	&	 Sinnott,	 2015;	Garry,	 2013;	Hobolt,	 2009).	
Because	EU	citizens	 lack	direct	 interaction	with	 the	Union	 in	 their	daily	 lives,	how	domestic	politicians	
present	the	referendum	proposal	to	them	matters.	The	extent	to	which	they	discuss	the	consequences	
of	 approving	 or	 rejecting	 the	 proposal	 influences	 voting	 behaviour.	 For	 instance,	 when	 politicians	
emphasize	the	negative	consequences	of	voting	in	favour	of	a	proposal,	more	people	oppose	it.	
Despite	this	emphasis	on	EU	referendum	campaigns,	the	existing	studies	overlook	an	important	
aspect,	 namely	 the	 asymmetrical	 political	 advantage	 in	 such	 campaigns.	 The	 broader	 literature	 on	
referendums	and	public	opinion	suggests	that	 in	a	referendum	the	No	side	typically	has	the	advantage	
since	 it	 can	 boost	 the	 public’s	 fears	 by	 linking	 the	 proposal	 to	 unpopular	 issues	 (e.g.	 LeDuc,	 2005;	
Nadeau,	 Martin,	 &	 Blais,	 1999).	 This	 article	 explores	 whether	 this	 dynamic	 applies	 to	 EU	 treaty	
ratification	referendums,	which	are	votes	on	the	ratification	of	an	EU	amending	treaty.1	Does	the	anti-EU	
treaty	 campaign	 have	 more	 advantage	 than	 the	 pro-EU	 treaty	 campaign	 in	 these	 referendums?	 This	
aspect	 is	all	 the	more	 important	because	 the	existing	 studies	of	EU	 referendums	show	that	 the	voting	
public	usually	starts	with	an	early	positive	opinion	toward	EU	treaties	but	that	this	positive	attitude	often	
melts	 away,	 culminating	 in	 rejections	 (Atikcan,	 2015a).	 Does	 the	 anti-EU	 side	 have	 an	 easier	 task	 in	
                                                
1	This	classification	thus	excludes	accession	(membership)	and	policy	referendums.		
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emphasizing	the	negative	consequences	of	voting	for	further	integration,	than	the	pro-EU	side	trying	to	
stress	the	negative	consequences	of	voting	against	further	integration?	
Although	the	literature	mentions	the	innate	advantage	often	held	by	the	No	side,	the	factors	that	
contribute	 to	 such	 an	 advantage	 are	 not	 specified;	 neither	 are	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 this	
advantage	could	potentially	swap	to	the	Yes	side.	I	argue	that	the	main	factor	behind	this	advantage	is	
the	agenda	setting	power,	specifically	concerning	the	negative	consequences	of	the	vote	choice.	Given	
that	 the	 No	 side	 does	 not	 need	 a	 coherent	 case	 and	 can	 attack	 a	 proposal	 from	multiple	 angles,	 we	
would	expect	a	multidimensional	referendum	proposal	to	provide	more	of	an	advantage	to	the	No	side	
by	offering	more	material	to	campaign	on	and	more	risks	to	highlight.	In	contrast,	when	the	proposal	is	
limited	to	a	single	topic,	we	would	expect	such	an	advantage	to	be	reduced.	In	such	cases,	where	the	No	
side’s	 hand	 is	 restrained,	 the	 Yes	 side	 would	 have	 increased	 chances	 to	 set	 the	 agenda	 around	 the	
consequences	of	a	No	vote.		
In	 this	 article,	 I	 analyse	 campaign	 strategies	 in	 11	 EU	 treaty	 ratification	 referendums,	 which	
provide	 a	 clear	 juxtaposition	 between	 pro-treaty	 (Yes)	 and	 anti-treaty	 (No)	 campaigns.	 Based	 on	 140	
interviews	with	campaigners	in	11	referendums,	a	series	of	indicators	on	political	setting	and	campaign	
characteristics,	as	well	as	an	in-depth	case	study	of	the	2012	Irish	Fiscal	Compact	referendum,	I	find	that	
the	anti-treaty	side	indeed	holds	the	advantage	if	 it	engages	the	debate.	Nonetheless,	the	findings	also	
show	 that	 this	 advantage	 is	 not	 unconditional.	 The	 underlying	 mechanism	 rests	 on	 the	
multidimensionality	of	the	issue.	The	extent	to	which	the	referendum	debate	includes	a	large	variety	of	
No	 campaign	arguments	 correlates	 strongly	with	 the	 campaigners’	 perceived	advantage/disadvantage,	
and	 the	 referendum	 results.	When	 the	No	 side’s	 arguments	 are	 limited	 (either	 through	 a	 single-issue	
treaty	 or	 guarantees	 from	 the	 EU),	 this	 provides	 the	 Yes	 side	 with	 a	 ‘cleaner’	 agenda	 to	 work	 with.	
Importantly,	the	detailed	data	demonstrates	that	the	availability	of	arguments	 is	 important	for	the	Yes	
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side	as	well.	 They	 tend	 to	have	 the	most	advantage	when	 they	 can	 tap	 into	 the	economic	 costs	of	an	
anti-EU	vote.		
Below	I	first	explore	the	literature	on	referendums	to	understand	how	an	asymmetrical	political	
advantage	might	affect	the	functioning	of	direct	democracy	 in	the	EU.	Next,	 I	present	data	from	11	EU	
treaty	ratification	referendums,	as	well	as	an	in-depth	study	of	an	outlier	case,	which	reveal	the	specific	
factors	behind	such	an	advantage.	I	conclude	the	article	by	a	discussion	of	this	research’s	implications	for	
other	kinds	of	EU	and	non-EU	referendums.	
	
How	does	the	asymmetrical	political	advantage	affect	direct	democracy	in	the	EU?	
Research	 into	 EU	 referendums	 has	 only	 recently	 turned	 its	 attention	 to	 referendum	 campaigns.	 This	
literature	 has	 three	 traditional	 explanations,	 linking	 referendum	 results	 to	 government	 approval	 rates	
(‘second-order’	approach),	to	European-level	policy	preferences	(‘issue-voting’	approach)	and	party	cues.	
The	 ‘second-order’	 approach	 suggests	 that	 voting	 behaviour	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 national	 factors	
such	as	the	level	of	satisfaction	with	the	government	(Reif	&	Schmitt,	1980).	The	‘issue-voting’	model	on	
the	other	hand	argues	that	citizens	vote	 in	 line	with	their	underlying	broad	attitudes	toward	European	
integration,	 primarily	 shaped	 by	 their	 socioeconomic	 status	 and	 views	 on	 immigration	 (e.g.	 Gabel	 &	
Palmer,	 1995;	McLaren,	 2002;	 Siune	 et	 al.,	 1994).	 The	 fewer	 areas	 voters	want	 included	 in	 European	
integration,	 the	more	 they	 vote	 against	 the	 EU	 in	 referendums.	 Alternatively,	 research	 on	 party	 cues	
suggests	that	voters’	identification	with	political	parties,	and	the	positioning	of	these	parties,	determine	
their	voting	behaviour	(e.g.	Ray,	2003).	However,	detailed	survey-based	analyses	find	that	dissatisfaction	
with	 the	government,	attitudes	 toward	European	 integration,	and	party	 identification	all	 influence	 the	
vote	choice	(e.g.	Aarts	&	van	der	Kolk,	2006;	de	Vreese	&	Boomgaarden,	2007;	Hobolt,	2009).		
The	 new	 question	 is	 thus	 how	 campaign	 information	 mediates	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 different	
issues	become	salient	in	the	minds	of	voters	(Hobolt	&	Brouard,	2011,	p.	310).	For	instance,	people	are	
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shown	to	rely	more	on	their	attitudes	toward	Europe	if	the	campaign	is	intense	(high-salience)	(Garry	et	
al.,	 2005;	 Hobolt,	 2009).	 Existing	 research	 shows	 that	 political	 parties	 serve	 as	 information	 providers	
during	these	campaigns	and	frame	the	meaning	of	the	choice	that	voters	face	in	referendums	(Atikcan,	
2015a;	Chong	&	Druckman,	2007;	Hobolt,	2009;	Laycock,	2013;	Pammett	&	LeDuc,	2001).	 Importantly,	
the	 voting	 behaviour	 literature	 suggests	 that,	 in	 most	 instances,	 referendum	 campaigns	 are	 actually	
more	 influential	 than	election	campaigns	 (e.g.	de	Vreese	&	Semetko,	2004;	Schuck	&	de	Vreese,	2008;	
Suiter	&	Reidy,	 2015).	When	parties	 line	 up	 in	 a	 non-traditional	way,	 or	 the	 issue	 is	 unfamiliar	 to	 the	
mass	 public,	 referendum	 campaigns	 can	 be	 decisive	 (LeDuc,	 2002).	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 in	
referendums	on	 international	 treaties,	as	voters	do	not	have	well-formed	opinions.	The	treaties	of	 the	
European	Union	are	particularly	difficult	to	understand	because	the	EU	is	highly	complex	and	the	public	
has	a	limited	understanding	of	the	EU’s	competences	and	institutions.	Moreover,	in	EU	referendums	the	
government	and	all	 the	mainstream	political	parties	almost	always	campaign	on	 the	pro-treaty	side	as	
Euroscepticism	 is	 confined	 to	 the	 extremes	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	 (De	 Vries,	 2009;	 Taggart,	 1998;	
Taggart	&	Szczerbiak,	2013).	The	combination	of	these	ad	hoc	unconventional	political	alliances	and	the	
technical	nature	of	the	EU	treaties	means	that	the	public	often	needs	the	campaign	information	to	make	
up	their	minds.	Looking	at	the	ideal	types	of	opinion	trends	during	referendum	campaigns	established	by	
LeDuc	 (2002),	 referendums	on	EU	 treaty	 ratification	belong	 to	 the	opinion	 formation	pattern,	which	 is	
common	to	all	referendums	where	there	is	little	partisan	or	ideological	basis,	and	where	individuals	take	
more	time	to	make	a	decision	and	that	decision	becomes	highly	unpredictable.	This	is	largely	in	line	with	
the	findings	of	the	existing	literature	pointing	to	the	initial	positive	attitudes	toward	EU	treaties,	which	
decline	frequently	in	the	process	of	referendum	campaigns	(Atikcan,	2015a).	
While	 the	 existing	 studies	 of	 EU	 referendums	 emphasize	 the	 role	 of	 campaign	 intensity	 and	
information,	 they	 rarely	 study	 how	 political	 actors	 actively	 provide	 this	 information.	 In	 a	 comparative	
study	of	EU	referendums,	Hobolt	 (2009)	 finds	 that	when	the	negative	consequences	of	a	No-vote/Yes-
Ece	Ozlem	Atikcan,	European	Journal	of	Political	Research	
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vote	 are	 stressed,	 more	 people	 favour/oppose	 the	 proposal.	 Garry	 (2013)	 similarly	 shows	 that	
perceptions	 of	 treaty	 implications	matter	 the	most	 to	 voters	 and	 that	 these	 are	 particularly	 open	 to	
short-term	change	in	the	context	of	intense	campaigning	by	political	actors.	More	specifically,	Elkink	and	
Sinnott	(2015)	demonstrate	that	the	more	voters’	perceptions	of	the	contents	of	the	treaty	are	aligned	
with	the	No	campaign,	the	more	they	vote	No,	and	vice	versa	for	the	Yes	campaign.	Garry	(2014)	looks	
into	the	emotional	basis	of	voting	behavior	in	EU	referendums,	showing	that	campaign	information	can	
in	 fact	 lead	 to	 fear	 or	 anger,	 and	 that	 fearful	 citizens	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 vote	 for	 the	 option	 that	 is	
presented	as	less-risky	(see	Druckman	&	McDermott,	2008).		
But	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 one	 side	 of	 the	 campaign,	 namely	 the	 anti-treaty	 side,	 has	 an	
advantage	in	making	its	case	is	overlooked.	The	literature	on	referendums	suggests	that	No	campaigners	
do	not	necessarily	need	to	make	a	coherent	and	persuasive	case	against	a	proposal	(Jerit,	2004;	LeDuc,	
2005).	They	need	only	to	raise	doubts	or	link	the	proposal	to	other	less	popular	issues.	The	No	side	can	
prevail	if	it	conducts	careful	research	on	what	parts	of	the	issue	voters	would	not	like	and	make	effective	
commercials	playing	to	these	themes	(de	Vreese	&	Semetko,	2004).	However,	the	concrete	mechanisms	
that	lead	to	this	advantage	are	underspecified	in	the	literature.	The	core	idea	is	that	the	No	campaigners	
can	use	risk	aversion,	a	powerful	basis	on	which	to	appeal	to	some	voters,	and	that	the	No	side	‘usually	
(but	not	always)’	holds	a	monopoly	on	this	emotion	(LeDuc,	2005,	p.	179).		But	what	would	make	the	Yes	
and	 No	 campaigns	 more	 or	 less	 able	 to	 have	 such	 leverage?	 	 Do	 the	 anti-EU	 treaty	 campaigners	
systematically	succeed	in	setting	the	debate	around	the	negative	consequences	of	voting	in	favour	of	a	
new	treaty?	Are	there	factors	that	limit	this	asymmetrical	advantage?	
In	 order	 to	 answer	 these	 questions,	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 process	 of	 agenda	 setting.	 Theories	 of	
strategic	communications	focus	on	agenda	setting,	priming	and	framing	in	a	political	campaign.		Agenda	
setting	 is	 the	process	 in	which	competing	political	elites	define	 their	most	 relevant	 issues	and	present	
them	 to	 the	 public’s	 attention.	 This	 process	 is	 crucial	 for	 political	 elites,	 as	 agenda	 foreshadows	
Ece	Ozlem	Atikcan,	European	Journal	of	Political	Research	
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outcomes	and	determines	the	path	to	final	voting	choice	(Iyengar,	1993;	Riker,	1993;	Soroka,	2002).	The	
issues	 placed	 on	 the	 agenda	 become	 primed;	 in	 other	 words,	 become	 the	 principal	 dimensions	 for	
evaluating	candidates	or	parties.	Framing	theory	takes	a	step	further	and	 looks	 into	the	ways	 in	which	
politicians	present	particular	 ideas	(Benford	&	Snow,	2000;	Chong	&	Druckman,	2007;	Goffman,	1974).		
A	speaker’s	framing,	an	emphasis	on	a	particular	set	of	potentially	relevant	concerns,	causes	individuals	
to	focus	on	these	concerns	when	building	their	opinions.		
In	line	with	the	findings	of	the	referendum	literature,	we	would	expect	the	No	campaign	–	which	
aims	 to	 reject	 the	 EU	 treaty	 on	 offer	 –	 to	 have	more	 ability	 to	 control	 the	 agenda	 and	 to	 frame	 the	
debate	 around	 their	 themes,	 if	 it	 engaged	 the	 debate.	 Indeed,	 looking	 at	 the	 strategies	 used	 in	 EU	
referendums	on	 treaty	 ratification,	 the	anti-treaty	 campaigns	 typically	 argue	 that	 the	 treaty	will	 cause	
loss	 of	 political	 autonomy	 in	 key	 fields	 such	 as	 social	 policy,	 citizenship	 rules,	 immigration,	 military	
neutrality	and	moral	 issues	such	as	abortion,	even	when	those	themes	are	not	present	 in	the	treaty	at	
hand	(e.g.	Atikcan,	2015a;	Hobolt,	2009;	Mendez,	Mendez,	&	Triga,	2016).		
I	 argue	 that	 the	 underlying	mechanism	 of	 this	 agenda	 setting	 advantage	 is	 the	 availability	 of	
arguments.	We	would	expect	a	multidimensional	proposal	to	maximize	such	an	advantage,	where	the	No	
campaign	 is	 free	 to	 attack	 the	 referendum	proposal	 from	a	 variety	 of	 angles	without	 having	 to	worry	
about	the	coherence	of	its	arguments.	In	other	words,	a	broader	referendum	topic	would	allow	the	No	
side	to	bring	up	different	kinds	of	risks,	as	opposed	to	single-issue	referendums,	which	would	 limit	the	
range	of	such	No	camp	arguments.	In	turn,	in	cases	where	the	No	side	is	constrained,	the	Yes	side	would	
have	an	easier	job	of	stressing	the	negative	consequences	of	a	No	vote.	
	
Data	
To	 investigate	 this	 phenomenon,	 I	 study	 the	 framing	 of	 the	 referendum	 proposal	 in	 11	 EU	 treaty	
ratification	referendums.	I	conceptualize	the	political	advantage	as	the	control	of	the	agenda	setting	in	a	
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referendum	 campaign,	 and	 specifically	 on	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 the	 vote	 choice.	 There	 are	
usually	 different	 kinds	 of	 arguments	 that	 focus	 on	 the	 negative	 consequences	 in	 EU	 referendum	
campaigns,	underlining	the	economic,	political,	social	and	cultural	consequences	relating	to	the	proposal.	
In	 this	 research,	 setting	 the	 agenda	 around	 the	 consequences	 signifies	 advancing	 as	 many	 of	 these	
arguments	as	possible.		
In	order	to	assess	the	political	advantage	in	these	referendums,	I	use	two	kinds	of	data:	first,	a	
series	of	 indicators	on	campaign	characteristics	and	political	setting	to	serve	as	controls,	and	interview	
data	and	content	analyses	to	study	the	agenda	setting.	The	data	 is	helpful	 in	testing	two	expectations.	
First,	we	would	expect	the	interview	data	to	confirm	that	the	No	side	is	perceived	as	more	able	than	the	
Yes	side	to	set	the	agenda	around	the	consequences	of	the	vote	choice	when	it	engages	the	debate	and	
when	the	proposal	 is	multidimensional.	 	Second,	we	would	expect	 these	perceptions	 to	correlate	with	
certain	campaign	characteristics	and	 referendum	outcomes.	 In	other	words,	 if	 the	No	side	was	 indeed	
perceived	as	more	able	than	the	Yes	side	to	set	the	agenda,	we	would	expect	this	factor	to	be	correlated	
with	an	increase	in	negative	vote	intentions	over	the	course	of	the	campaign	and	a	higher	rejection	rate.	
The	 theory	 would	 not	 hold	 if	 the	 Yes	 side	 was	 seen	 to	 have	 more	 advantage	 than	 the	 No	 side	 in	 a	
multidimensional	debate,	or	if	the	referendum	results	were	instead	correlated	with	the	control	variables,	
or	if	there	was	no	connection	between	the	perceptions	of	the	campaigners,	the	campaign	characteristics	
and	the	referendum	outcomes.	
The	11	EU	treaty	ratification	referendums	at	hand	are	shown	 in	Table	1.	The	study	 includes	all	
the	treaty	ratification	referendums	since	2005	as	well	as	the	treaty	ratification	referendums	where	the	
public	 was	 asked	 to	 vote	 twice	 on	 the	 same	 subject.	 The	 latter	 category	 is	 theoretically	 interesting	
because	in	all	cases,	the	public	first	rejected	but	then	accepted	the	same	EU	treaty.	In	all	these	repeated	
cases,	 the	 EU	became	 involved	between	 the	 two	 referendums,	 offering	 guarantees	 and	 taking	 certain	
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arguments	 off	 the	 table.	 These	 cases	 thus	 provide	 a	 unique	 opportunity	 to	 study	 how	 the	 campaign	
agenda	shifted	in	the	repeat	referendums,	keeping	all	else	constant.		
Table	1	here	
	
Campaign	characteristics	and	political	setting	
The	goal	of	the	indicators	presented	in	Table	1	is	to	compare	the	various	aspects	of	the	campaigns	and	
the	political	setting	in	these	11	EU	referendums	and	to	detect	any	regularities	that	might	correlate	with	
the	 referendum	 outcomes.	 To	 begin	 with,	 campaign	 intensity	 (salience)	 and	 turnout	 data	 help	 us	
understand	the	extent	to	which	there	was	an	active	debate	between	rival	campaigns.2	If	the	anti-treaty	
side	did	not	mount	a	 substantive	campaign,	we	would	not	expect	 them	to	have	an	advantage.	Hobolt	
(2009,	 p.	 93)	 measures	 campaign	 intensity	 based	 on	 three	 indicators:	 the	 partisan	 polarization	
(opposition	 to	 the	 ballot	 proposal	 in	 parliament),	 the	 perceived	 closeness	 of	 the	 race	 (difference	
between	 the	 two	 sides	 in	 the	 polls),	 and	 the	 news	 coverage	 (number	 of	 daily	 articles	monitoring	 the	
referendum	 issue	 during	 the	 three	 months	 leading	 up	 to	 the	 referendum).	 This	 provides	 the	 most	
comparable	measure	in	the	literature	as	she	measures	the	intensity	of	19	EU	referendum	campaigns.		
Second,	 the	move	 in	 the	voting	 intentions	over	 the	course	of	 the	 long	campaign	 (measured	as	
the	difference	between	 the	negative	voting	 intentions	 six	 to	eight	months	before	 the	 referendum	and	
the	 percentage	 of	 the	 final	 No	 vote)	 shows	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 public	 opinion	 has	 potentially	 been	
sensitive	 to	 campaign	 information.	3	As	 discussed,	 in	 opinion	 formation	 campaigns,	 the	 referendum	
campaign	 can	 be	 decisive	 since	 public	 opinion	 is	 unpredictable.	 If	 public	 opinion	 moved	 significantly	
during	the	campaign,	this	would	confirm	that	individuals’	opinions	on	the	subject	were	volatile.	Similarly,	
the	 central	 themes	 of	 the	 No	 campaign,	 based	 on	 the	 interview	 data	 and	 the	 existing	 literature,	
                                                
2	These	 two	 indicators,	 campaign	 intensity	 and	 turnout,	 are	 seen	 to	 be	 closely	 related	 in	 referendums	 (Hobolt,	
2007;	LeDuc,	2007).	
3	I	use	the	CIS	barometers	in	the	Spanish	case,	the	CSA	polls	in	France,	the	SCP	reports	in	the	Netherlands,	the	TNS-
ILRES	polls	in	Luxembourg,	and	poll	figures	from	secondary	sources	in	the	Danish	and	Irish	cases	(FitzGibbon,	2009,	
2013;	Sinnott	&	Elkink,	2010;	Siune	et	al.,	1994;	Svensson,	2002).		
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demonstrate	whether	the	anti-treaty	campaigners	mobilized	various	attack	lines	against	the	EU	treaties	
to	control	the	agenda	on	consequences	and	to	drive	down	the	support	for	these	treaties.		
Next,	turning	to	the	political	setting,	the	figures	on	government	popularity,	EU	support	and	party	
consensus	 (variables	 closely	 linked	 to	 alternative	 explanations	 –	 second-order,	 issue-voting	 and	 party	
cues	approaches)	 are	 important	 to	understand	whether	 these	 factors	pre-determined	 the	 referendum	
results.	 Government	 popularity	 figures	 are	 primarily	 based	 on	 national	 polls	 in	 the	 last	 six	 months	
leading	up	to	the	vote.4	The	figures	on	EU	support	and	party	consensus	are	based	on	the	measurement	
of	 Mendez	 et	 al.	 (2016):	 the	 EU	 support	 represents	 the	 percentages	 of	 those	 who	 thought	 that	 EU	
membership	 is	 a	 ‘good	 thing’	 in	 the	 Eurobarometer	 surveys	 directly	 preceding	 the	 vote,	 and	 party	
consensus	 is	 measured	 as	 the	 absolute	 difference	 between	 the	 percentage	 of	 seats	 held	 by	 political	
parties	in	favour	of	a	Yes	vote	and	those	that	favour	a	No	vote	(0	being	no	consensus	and	100	being	full	
consensus).	 To	 nuance	 the	 party	 cues	 point	 beyond	 the	 party	 consensus	 measure,	 the	 mentioned	
tendency	of	the	government	and	all	the	mainstream	political	parties	to	campaign	on	the	pro-treaty	side	
(e.g.	De	Vries,	2009)	applies	to	the	11	referendums	studied	here.	Roughly	speaking,	the	far	right	and	far	
left	parties	 are	against	 the	EU	 treaties	and	 the	parties	 in	 the	middle	are	 for	 them.	The	 cases	are	 thus	
comparable.	 Nonetheless,	 there	 are	 two	 points	 to	 be	 stressed.	 First,	 in	 the	 European	 Constitution	
referendums	in	France,	the	Netherlands	and	Luxembourg,	the	social	democratic	parties	had	official	pro-
treaty	 stances	 but	 were	 de	 facto	 divided.	 Second,	 in	 the	 Danish	Maastricht	 Treaty	 referendums,	 the	
Socialist	 People’s	 Party	 switched	 from	 the	 anti-treaty	 side	 to	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 in	 the	 second	
referendum.		Yet,	a	detailed	debate	in	the	literature	links	these	issues	to	campaign	information,	arguing	
that	 these	divisions	and	 shifts	nuanced	 the	campaign	 information	available	 to	 the	public	 (e.g.	Atikcan,	
2015b;	Hobolt,	2006;	Svensson,	2002).	This	aspect	is	captured	through	the	interview	data.	Finally,	Table	
1	presents	 information	on	the	 initiator	of	each	referendum	based	on	the	measurement	of	Oppermann	
                                                
4	I	use	the	same	sources	listed	in	Footnote	3.	
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(2013)	 to	 assess	whether	 the	 triggering	mechanism	of	 the	 referendum	correlates	with	 the	 results,	 for	
instance	showing	a	higher	rejection	rate	for	referendums	that	were	initiated	by	the	opposition.5		
Another	 important	 factor,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 political	 setting,	 relates	 to	 the	 referendum	 laws	 on	
campaign	 broadcasting.	 Among	 the	 cases	 discussed,	 Ireland	 is	 the	 only	 one	with	 peculiar	 laws	 in	 this	
regard.	In	the	Irish	case,	through	Supreme	Court	ruling	Coughlan	v.	Broadcasting	Complaints	Commission	
and	RTÉ,	 the	No	campaigners	were	granted	equal	airtime	 in	 referendum	campaigns.6	Coughlan’s	 court	
case	secured	equal	airtime	on	public	broadcasting	service	RTE	for	the	Yes	and	No	camps,	as	opposed	to	
the	previous	system	of	proportionality	with	 the	allocation	of	 seats	 in	 the	Parliament,	 the	Dáil	Éireann.	
This	boosts	the	visibility	of	the	No	campaign’s	arguments,	even	when	most	parties	are	in	favour	of	the	EU	
treaty,	 increasing	 the	 asymmetrical	 political	 advantage	 further.	 Although	 the	 literature	 hints	 that	 the	
interpretation	of	this	law	could	have	had	an	impact	on	the	referendum	debate,	this	peculiarity	does	not	
correlate	with	the	referendum	outcomes	in	the	cases	under	study	(Atikcan,	2015b,	p.	13).	
	
Interview	data	
Interview	 data	 reveals	 the	 campaigners’	 perception	 of	 this	 political	 advantage,	 and	 content	 analyses	
provide	 systematic	 maps	 of	 these	 perceptions.	 I	 conducted	 field	 research	 in	 France,	 Spain,	 the	
Netherlands	 and	 Luxembourg	 in	 2008	 on	 the	 European	 Constitution	 referendums,	 in	 Denmark	 and	
Ireland	in	2011	on	the	Nice,	Maastricht	and	Lisbon	Treaty	referendums,	and	in	Ireland	again	in	2015	on	
the	Fiscal	Compact	referendum.	I	interviewed	around	140	campaigners	from	all	political	parties	and	civil	
society	 groups	 that	 were	 active	 in	 the	 campaigns.	 These	 interviews	 were	 face-to-face	 and	 semi-
structured,	based	on	opportunity	and	snowball	sampling.	
Interviews	with	campaigners	included	questions	on	their	campaign	themes,	campaign	strategies	
and	 the	 difficulties	 they	 faced	 during	 their	 campaigns,	 as	 well	 as	 questions	 on	 the	 performance	 and	
                                                
5	The	repeat	referendums	on	the	Maastricht,	Nice	and	Lisbon	Treaties	are	more	complicated	to	code	than	others	as	
they	are	initiated	as	a	mix	of	factors,	involving	the	governments,	opposition	and	the	EU.	
6	See	(Barrett,	2010)	for	a	detailed	discussion	of	this	ruling.		
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mistakes	of	the	rival	campaigns.	In	Table	2	below,	I	manually	coded	their	responses	on	whether	they	(or	
the	rival	campaign)	had	an	‘advantage’	or	an	‘easier	job’,	and	whether	they	(or	the	rival	campaign)	used	
‘fear’	or	‘threats’	or	‘blackmail’,	which	provide	direct	information	on	their	perception	of	who	controlled	
the	agenda	on	the	negative	consequences	of	the	vote	choice.	More	importantly,	interview	data	is	helpful	
also	 to	 understand	 the	 reasons	 behind	 these	 perceptions.	 In	 explaining	 their	 campaigning	 experience	
and	 the	 challenges	 they	 faced,	 campaigners	highlight	 the	 factors	 that	 cause	 the	political	 advantage	 to	
change	hands.	
Table	2	here	
	
I	take	a	step	further	in	the	case	of	the	Fiscal	Compact	referendum	in	Ireland	and	present	detailed	
interview	 data	 as	 well	 as	 data	 based	 on	 a	 content	 analysis	 of	 campaign	 statements.	 The	 reason	 for	
choosing	this	case	for	further	study	 is	twofold.	First,	 it	provides	an	outlier	case	at	first	glance,	as	 it	will	
become	clear	in	the	analysis	below.	Second,	the	Irish	Parliament	formed	a	Sub-Committee	on	the	Fiscal	
Compact	 to	 stimulate	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 treaty	 (Sub-Committee	 Report,	 2012),	 which	 provided	 an	
untapped	 source	 of	 data	 to	 analyse	 the	 campaign	 agenda	 further.	 I	 do	 a	 content	 analysis	 of	 the	
transcripts	of	 51	 contributions,	 coming	 from	 social	 partners,	 academics,	 economists	 and	 Irish	MEPs.	A	
full	list	of	the	individuals	interviewed,	the	interview	questionnaire,	the	codebook	of	content	analysis	and	
some	sample	campaign	posters	are	presented	in	the	online	appendix.	
	
Setting	the	agenda	in	EU	treaty	ratification	referendums		
Looking	 closely	 at	 the	 two	 tables,	 the	 data	 on	 the	 political	 setting	 (Table	 1)	 reveal	 that	 government	
popularity,	EU	support,	party	consensus	or	how	the	referendum	was	initiated	do	not	have	a	systematic	
relation	 to	 the	 referendum	 outcomes.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 indicators	 on	 campaign	 characteristics	
(Table	1)	and	the	interview	data	(Table	2)	tell	a	meaningful	story	about	how	these	campaigns	unfolded.	
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Where	the	campaign	characteristics	indicate	high	campaign	intensity	and	high	volatility	in	public	opinion,	
campaigners	perceive	an	advantage	for	the	anti-treaty	side.	Importantly,	these	cases	are	also	the	ones	in	
which	 the	 referendum	 proposal	 was	 more	 multidimensional,	 providing	 support	 for	 the	 proposed	
underlying	mechanism	for	such	an	advantage.		
Campaign	intensity	and	turnout	figures	in	Table	1	are	helpful	in	identifying	the	cases	where	there	
was	no	active	debate	between	the	rival	campaigns:	the	European	Constitution	campaign	in	Spain	and	the	
first	campaign	on	the	Nice	Treaty	in	Ireland	were	among	the	lowest	intensity	ones.	In	the	Spanish	case,	
this	 is	 related	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 substantive	 campaign	 by	 the	 anti-treaty	 side	 (Torreblanca,	 2005).	 Not	
engaging	the	debate,	 the	anti-treaty	side	would	thus	not	be	expected	to	have	a	political	advantage.	 In	
the	Irish	case,	the	low	intensity	and	turnout	figures	were	linked	to	the	absence	of	a	thorough	pro-treaty	
campaign	(Laffan	&	Langan,	2005),	which	parallels	the	campaign	perceptions	below.		
The	No	vote	 intention	differential	distinguishes	 the	 campaigns	where	public	opinion	was	quite	
volatile	from	those	where	it	was	not.	The	figures	in	Table	1	show	that	negative	public	opinion	increased	
significantly	 in	most	 referendums.	 However,	 the	 anti-treaty	 vote	 intentions	 either	 did	 not	 increase	 or	
increased	relatively	little	in	the	second	referendums	on	Maastricht,	Nice	and	Lisbon	Treaties,	as	well	as	
the	 Fiscal	 Compact	 referendum	 and	 the	 Spanish	 referendum	 on	 the	 European	 Constitution.	 In	 the	
Spanish	case,	it	is	in	line	with	the	expectations,	as	the	anti-treaty	campaign	was	not	very	vocal.	As	for	the	
other	cases,	 interview	data	sheds	 light	on	why	the	anti-treaty	sides	seem	to	benefit	 less	 from	such	an	
advantage.		
Looking	at	the	central	themes	of	the	campaign,	in	all	cases	the	anti-treaty	side	mounted	various	
themes	on	the	agenda	to	highlight	the	negative	consequences	of	the	proposed	EU	treaty	for	the	public.	
Only	in	the	second	referendums	on	the	Maastricht,	Nice	and	Lisbon	Treaties	this	was	impossible	because	
the	EU	has	provided	guarantees	on	the	anti-treaty	themes	used	in	the	first	referendums.	 In	the	repeat	
referendums,	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 argued	 that	 the	 EU	 (or	 more	 precisely	 other	 member	 states	 acting	
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through	 the	 European	 Council)	 had	 listened	 to	 the	 Danish/Irish	 people	 and	 responded	 with	 legal	
guarantees.	 In	 line	with	 the	Edinburgh	Agreement,	Denmark	would	have	 four	opt-outs	 in	 the	 fields	of	
European	 citizenship,	 economic	 and	 monetary	 union,	 defence	 policy,	 and	 justice	 and	 home	 affairs.	
Ireland,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 gained	 a	 guarantee	 concerning	 its	 military	 neutrality	 with	 the	 Seville	
Declaration	after	 the	Nice	referendum.	Once	again,	after	 the	Lisbon	referendum,	the	 Irish	government	
obtained	 guarantees	 on	 the	 Irish	 commissioner,	 Irish	 competency	 over	 tax	 rates,	 abortion,	 neutrality,	
and	workers’	rights.	These	were	the	themes	the	anti-treaty	campaigns	raised	in	the	first	referendums	but	
they	could	not	do	 so	 in	 the	 repeat	 referendums	due	 to	 the	 legal	 guarantees	 (Sinnott,	2003;	Sinnott	&	
Elkink,	2010;	Siune	et	al.,	1994).		
Interview	 data	 parallels	 these	 patterns	 and	 uncovers	 the	 perception	 of	 campaigners	 on	 who	
controlled	 the	 agenda.	 In	 responding	 to	questions	on	 campaign	 themes,	 strategies	 and	 the	difficulties	
they	faced,	campaigners	mention	which	side	‘had	an	advantage’	or	an	‘easier	job’,	and	whether	they	(or	
the	 rival	 campaign)	 used	 ‘fear’	 or	 ‘threats’	 or	 ‘blackmail’.	 Table	 2	 categorizes	 their	 responses.	 The	
marked	cells	indicate	that	a	majority	of	the	respondents	agreed	with	the	mentioned	statement.		
There	 are	 two	 narratives	 in	 the	 interview	 data.	 The	 first	 one	 is	 visible	 in	 the	 European	
Constitution	 referendums	 and	 in	 the	 first	 referendums	 on	 the	 Maastricht,	 Nice	 and	 Lisbon	 Treaties.	
These	 treaties	were	 hundreds	 of	 pages	 long	 and	multidimensional,	 arming	 the	 anti-treaty	 side	with	 a	
wide	 array	 of	 arguments.	 In	 the	 French,	 Dutch	 and	 Luxembourgish	 campaigns,	 a	majority	 of	 the	 pro-
treaty	 campaigners	 argue	 that	 the	 anti-treaty	 side	 had	 an	 advantage	 and	 controlled	 the	 campaign	
agenda	on	the	negative	consequences	of	 the	vote	choice.	To	detail	 their	arguments,	 they	suggest	 that	
the	anti-treaty	side	brought	in	(often	unrelated)	themes	to	advance	the	idea	that	the	Constitution	would	
have	 negative	 consequences	 in	 terms	 of	 social	 benefits,	 national	 sovereignty,	 immigration,	 and	
militarization.	They	argue	that	given	the	lack	of	knowledge	on	the	EU,	the	anti-treaty	side	could	mobilize	
these	themes,	which	captured	the	public’s	mind	easily.	They	explain	that	 it	was	difficult	to	counter	the	
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multiplicity	 of	 anti-treaty	 arguments	 while	 trying	 to	 be	 coherent,	 and	 that	 when	 they	 were	 trying	 to	
achieve	that	they	were	cornered	to	a	defensive	campaign.	They	similarly	add	that	they	could	not	bring	
up	any	negative	consequences	relating	to	the	rejection	of	the	treaty.	The	anti-treaty	campaigners	do	not	
accept	 that	 they	 held	 an	 advantage	 but	 they	 do	 not	 argue	 that	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 controlled	 the	
campaign	 agenda	 either.	 They	 blame	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 for	 not	 paying	 attention	 to	 people’s	 existing	
worries	and	for	discussing	Europe	only	in	an	abstract	manner.		
Among	the	European	Constitution	referendums,	the	Spanish	case	provides	an	exception.	There	
has	 not	 been	 a	 significant	 campaign	 against	 the	 Constitution,	which	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 relatively	 low	
campaign	 intensity	 and	 turnout	 figures	 as	 well	 as	 the	 smaller	 movement	 of	 negative	 public	 opinion	
during	the	campaign	in	Table	1.	Campaigners	suggested	various	reasons	to	explain	the	lack	of	the	anti-
treaty	 campaign:	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 far	 right	movement,	 the	weakness	 of	 the	 far	 left	 civil	 society,	 and	 the	
strong	association	between	the	EU	and	democracy.	José	Ignacio	Torreblanca	of	the	Elcano	Royal	Institute	
summarized	 the	Spanish	 campaign	 in	 a	 few	words:	 ‘Instead	of	having	a	policy	debate	on	what	 sort	of	
Europe	 we	 want,	 we	 had	 sportsmen	 reading	 Article	 7	 of	 the	 Charter	 of	 Fundamental	 Rights	 on	
television’..7	Campaigners	from	both	sides	agreed	that	there	was	no	real	debate	and	that	given	the	lack	
of	 anti-treaty	 arguments,	 the	pro-treaty	 campaigners	were	able	 to	 tap	 into	what	 Europe	 stands	 for	 in	
Spain.	The	pro-treaty	side	does	not	hold	a	majoritarian	view	on	who	had	an	advantage	but	a	majority	of	
the	anti-treaty	campaigners	say	that	the	pro-treaty	side	had	an	easier	job.	
Continuing	with	the	first	narrative,	the	responses	in	the	first	referendums	on	the	Maastricht,	Nice	
and	Lisbon	Treaties	are	 in	 fact	 surprisingly	 similar	 to	 those	 in	 the	European	Constitution	 referendums.	
Like	 the	European	Constitution,	 these	 treaties	provided	 the	anti-treaty	 side	with	diverse	arguments.	A	
majority	 of	 pro-treaty	 campaigners	 suggest	 that	 the	 anti-treaty	 side	 controlled	 the	 agenda	 on	 the	
negative	consequences	of	the	vote	choice	as	they	mention	that	the	anti-treaty	side	had	an	easier	job	and	
used	 fearful	 arguments.	 To	 open	 up	 this	 data	 further,	 the	 pro-treaty	 campaigners	 in	 these	 first	
                                                
7	Interview,	6	October	2008.	
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referendums	 complain	 that	 the	 anti-treaty	 side	 tied	 the	 treaties	 to	 unpopular	 themes	 such	 as	 loss	 of	
sovereignty,	 creation	 of	 a	 political	 Union,	 interference	 into	 national	 laws	 and	 brought	 in	 themes	
unrelated	 to	 the	 EU	 treaty	 (‘red	 herrings’)	 to	 boost	 fears.	 Specifically	 referring	 to	 the	 public’s	
unfamiliarity	 with	 the	 EU,	 they	 add	 that	 they	 had	 difficulty	 responding	 to	 each	 and	 every	 anti-treaty	
argument,	 and	 that	 when	 they	 were	 trying	 to	 respond	 to	 these	 arguments	 they	 were	 getting	 into	 a	
defensive	mode	and	could	not	specify	their	own	arguments	or	the	consequences	of	the	rejection	of	the	
treaty.	The	anti-treaty	campaigners	do	not	necessarily	share	this	perceptive	but	they	do	not	say	that	the	
pro-treaty	 side	 had	 an	 advantage	 in	 setting	 the	 agenda	 either.	 They	 characterize	 their	 campaign	 as	
superior	 to	 the	 pro-treaty	 one	 arguing	 that	 the	 pro	 side	 took	 the	 positive	 result	 granted.	 This	 first	
narrative	(coming	from	the	three	referendums	on	the	European	Constitution	and	the	first	referendums	
in	the	case	of	the	repeated	referendums),	indicating	a	perception	that	the	anti-treaty	side	had	a	political	
advantage,	is	largely	paralleled	by	the	high	level	of	movement	in	negative	public	opinion	in	Table	1.	
The	 second	narrative	 comes	 from	 the	 second	 referendums	 on	 the	Maastricht,	Nice	 and	 Lisbon	
Treaties.	 Here,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 treaties	 offered	 a	 multidimensional	 platform	 for	 the	 anti-
treaty	campaigners,	the	guarantees	from	the	EU	limited	the	subject	considerably.	A	majority	of	both	pro-	
and	 anti-treaty	 campaigners	 agree	 that	 this	 time	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 controlled	 the	 agenda	 on	 the	
consequences	 of	 the	 vote	 choice.	Once	 again,	 to	 detail	 these	 perceptions,	 campaigners	 on	 both	 sides	
argue	 that	 the	 EU	 guarantees	 removed	 the	 controversial	 first-referendum	 themes	 of	 the	 anti-treaty	
camps	 from	 the	agenda,	and	 that	 the	pro-treaty	 side	pitched	 the	 second	 referendum	as	a	vote	on	EU	
membership	 and	 thereby	 named	 clear	 negative	 consequences	 to	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 treaty.	 In	 the	
second	 referendums,	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 could	 argue	 that	 the	 public	 no	 longer	 needed	 to	 fear	 the	
themes	brought	 in	by	the	anti-treaty	side	as	the	EU	had	now	provided	guarantees	that	they	would	not	
materialize.	In	the	face	of	these	assurances,	the	anti-treaty	campaigners	could	only	dispute	the	validity	of	
the	guarantees	and	 lost	 their	earlier	advantage,	as	can	also	be	observed	 in	 the	change	of	 their	central	
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campaign	themes	in	Table	1.	The	pro-treaty	campaigners	then	advanced	the	idea	that	a	second	No	vote	
would	mean	a	rejection	of	the	EU	and	loss	of	membership	and	economic	benefits.	In	the	second	Lisbon	
referendum,	 in	 addition	 to	 this	 argument,	 the	 pro-treaty	 campaign	 also	 advanced	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 Yes	
vote	would	be	the	only	solution	to	the	unfolding	economic	crisis	 in	Ireland	(for	campaign	materials	see	
appendix	 Figure	 A1).	 The	 pro-treaty	 side	 could	 thus	 control	 the	 campaign	 agenda	 on	 the	 negative	
consequences	when	the	hands	of	the	anti-treaty	side	were	tied	and	when	they	could	evoke	an	argument	
on	economic	 loss.	This	second	narrative,	highlighting	the	perceived	advantage	of	the	pro-treaty	side,	 is	
also	in	line	with	the	relatively	smaller	movement	of	negative	public	opinion	in	the	second	referendums	
on	 Maastricht,	 Nice,	 and	 Lisbon	 Treaties	 in	 Table	 1.	 There	 is	 one	 key	 difference	 in	 the	 Lisbon	
referendums.	Although	sharing	the	pattern	of	responses	with	the	other	repeated	referendums,	here,	a	
majority	 of	 the	 anti-treaty	 campaigners	 actually	 accept	 that	 they	 had	 an	 advantage	 in	 the	 first	
referendum	campaign.	Their	argument	 is	that	they	 learned	from	the	Nice	referendums	that	they	could	
ask	the	public	to	vote	No	in	the	first	referendum	in	order	to	get	a	‘better	deal’	(guarantees)	in	a	not-yet-
announced	but	almost-certain	second	referendum.		
What	 this	 data	 shows	 is	 that	when	 the	 anti-treaty	 campaign	participates	 actively	 in	 the	 treaty	
ratification	debate	and	when	the	referendum	proposal	is	multidimensional,	they	can	control	the	agenda	
setting	and	the	pro-treaty	side	perceives	the	advantage	of	the	rival	campaign	clearly	(first	narrative).	This	
perception	 importantly	 parallels	 the	 figures	 on	 the	 movement	 of	 negative	 public	 opinion	 in	 Table	 1.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 is	 perceived	 to	 have	 the	 advantage	 in	 repeat	 referendums	when	 the	
new	guarantees	from	the	EU	block	the	arguments	of	the	anti-treaty	side	and	when	the	pro-treaty	side	
can	bring	up	 the	economic	costs	of	an	exclusion	 from	the	EU	 (second	narrative).	This	perception	once	
again	 overlaps	 with	 the	 figures	 on	 the	 movement	 of	 negative	 public	 opinion	 in	 Table	 1.	 The	 Fiscal	
Compact	presents	an	outlier	at	first	glance,	however.	Table	2	shows	that	a	majority	of	both	pro-	and	anti-
treaty	campaigners	argue	that	the	pro-treaty	side	had	the	advantage	and	controlled	the	arguments	on	
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fear,	just	as	in	the	repeat	referendums,	despite	this	being	a	single	referendum.	The	answer	to	the	puzzle	
lies	in	the	multidimensionality	of	the	debate	as	I	discuss	in	detail	below.	
	
Looking	deeper:	The	Irish	referendum	on	the	Fiscal	Compact		
The	Fiscal	Compact	was	accepted	on	31	May	2012	 (39.7%	No	vote).	 Fianna	Fáil,	 Fine	Gael,	 the	Labour	
Party,	and	the	Green	Party	campaigned	for	a	Yes	vote,	while	the	Sinn	Féin,	the	Socialist	Party,	and	the	
Workers’	 Party	 called	 for	 a	No	 vote.	 Civil	 society	 pro-treaty	 campaign	Alliance	 for	 Ireland	participated	
actively	in	the	campaign.	On	the	anti-treaty	side,	interestingly,	the	Peace	and	Neutrality	Alliance	(PANA)	
and	 the	 pro-life	 Catholic	 group	 Cóir,	who	 are	 usual	 anti-treaty	 campaigners	 in	 Ireland,	 refrained	 from	
doing	so	in	the	Fiscal	Compact	campaign.	Similarly,	the	People’s	Movement	and	Libertas,	prominent	anti-
treaty	campaigners	in	previous	referendums,	were	considerably	less	active	in	this	referendum.	
While	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Celtic	 Tiger	 was	 slowly	 becoming	 visible	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 first	 Lisbon	
referendum,	the	second	referendum	saw	full-blown	economic	crisis.	Between	fall	2007	and	June	2009,	
polls	demonstrate	a	sharp	 increase	 in	 Irish	citizens’	concern	with	the	state	of	the	economy.	While	only	
8%	 named	 it	 as	 one	 of	 the	 two	most	 important	 issues	 in	 2007,	 this	 figure	 rose	 to	 48%	 by	 June	 2009	
(Eurobarometer,	2009).	In	2012,	unemployment	(62%)	and	economic	situation	(55%)	continued	to	be	the	
top	two	concerns	(Eurobarometer,	2012).	Satisfaction	with	the	government	followed	a	similar	pattern,	as	
can	be	 seen	 in	 Table	1.	 Surprisingly,	 voters	 rejected	 the	 Lisbon	Treaty	when	 they	were	more	 satisfied	
with	their	government	and	the	economic	situation,	and	accepted	both	the	Lisbon	Treaty	and	the	Fiscal	
Compact	when	they	were	 less	so,	going	against	 the	 ‘second-order’	approach	 in	 the	 literature,	which	 is	
why	a	close	look	at	campaign	dynamics	is	necessary.	
The	 anti-treaty	 side	 pitched	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact	 as	 the	 ‘Austerity	 Treaty’,	 called	 it	 a	 financial	
straight-jacket	and	linked	it	to	recent	and	unpopular	household	and	water	taxes.	The	pro-treaty	side,	on	
the	other	hand,	decided	to	tie	the	vote	to	the	economic	crisis.	They	presented	the	treaty	as	the	‘Stability	
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Treaty’,	emphasized	 its	 importance	for	 investment,	 job	creation	and	recovery	 in	the	crisis	context,	and	
argued	that	a	No	vote	would	not	stop	the	ratification	process	but	would	effectively	block	Ireland’s	access	
to	 a	 major	 new	 source	 of	 funding	 through	 the	 European	 Stability	 Mechanism	 (ESM)	 (for	 campaign	
materials	see	appendix	Figure	A2).		
	 In	the	interviews,	without	exception,	all	campaigners	argued	that	the	pro-treaty	side	controlled	
the	arguments	on	fear	and	the	negative	consequences,	instead	of	being	on	defence	as	it	had	happened	
in	many	 previous	 Irish	 referendums.	 Terry	Murphy	 of	 Fine	 Gael	 said:	 ‘[The	No	 side]	 certainly	 tried	 to	
make	 it	 into	a	 referendum	on	austerity.	 ...	But	 there	was	a	more	definitive	 risk	 that	we	could	put	out	
there.	If	we	don't	vote	Yes,	what	might	happen?	...	It	was	all	about	jobs,	the	future	of	the	economy,	the	
economic	security	and	our	position	within	the	EU’.8	Fianna	Fáil	MP	Timmy	Dooley	added:	‘The	fear	was	
on	the	Yes	side	...	in	other	debates	the	fear	was	about	all	sorts	of	extreme	circumstances	...	this	was	hard	
cash.	 The	 fear	was	 about	 the	 economy,	 it	was	 about	 your	 job	 ...	 in	 the	 eye	 of	 the	 storm’.9	Campaign	
Coordinator	of	Alliance	 for	 Ireland	Brendan	Halligan	 similarly	 said:	 ‘Psychologically	 it	was	a	 reversal	of	
previous	situations.	 ...	A	very	easy	campaign	 to	 run.	 ...	The	strategy	 this	 time	was	a	simple	one,	which	
was	to	repeat	 the	message	that	 this	was	 ...	absolutely	critical	 to	our	economic	survival’.10	Joe	Costello,	
Labour	Party	MP,	also	argued	that	it	was	the	pro-treaty	side	that	could	use	the	fear	tactic:11	
In	a	strange	way,	the	argument	was	on	the	Yes	side,	not	to	change	the	status	quo,	because	
the	Fiscal	Compact	was	 retaining	 the	European	solution.	Whereas	 in	many	of	 the	 treaties	
before	that,	we	were	proposing	a	change	in	our	relationship	with	the	EU	...	[This	time)	we	
were	saying	let's	stick	with	what	we	know	...	What	did	they	have	to	offer	as	an	alternative?	
...	 You	 can	 go	 out	 there	 and	 burn	 the	 bond	 holders.	 ...	 Who	 were	 we	 going	 to	 borrow	
money	from?	...	So	we	played,	to	a	degree,	we	played	the	fear	tactic	this	time,	whereas	the	
other	side	had	played	the	fear	tactic	in	all	the	other	treaties.	
	
	 Anti-treaty	 campaigners	 all	 mentioned	 that	 fear	 was	 the	 overriding	 factor	 in	 the	 pro-treaty	
campaign.	Peter	Lacey	of	the	People’s	Movement	noted:	‘They	played	it	absolutely	brilliantly.	...	A	lot	of	
                                                
8	Interview,	18	May	2015.	
9	Interview,	20	May	2015.	
10	Interview,	14	May	2015.	
11	Interview,	13	May	2015.	
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these	[Yes]	arguments	that	were	put	 forward	for	 the	Fiscal	Compact	and	for	 the	Lisbon	treaty	 [second	
referendum]	were	exactly	the	same.	It	was	simply	based	on	fear	...	bringing	Ireland	back	from	economic	
ruin’.12	Michael	 Taft,	 economist	 at	 Unite,	 resented	 that	 the	 campaign	 boiled	 down	 to	 the	 access	 to	
bailout	 funds	 without	 a	 detailed	 discussion:	 ‘The	 idea	 that	 you	 would	 follow	 a	 cyclically	 adjusted	
balanced	budget	[in	the	Fiscal	Compact]	is	loony.	...	But	the	overriding	question	was	that	if	we	didn't	pass	
this	referendum	we	wouldn't	get	any	bailout	money’.13		
	 The	 anti-treaty	 side	 tried	 to	 counter	 this	 specific	 argument.	 Paul	Murphy,	 Socialist	 Party	MP,	
said:	‘There	was	no	way	that	if	we	didn't	sign	we	couldn't	get	access	to	the	money.	...	 It's	all	a	political	
decision	to	be	made’.14	Nonetheless,	Sinn	Féin’s	Campaign	Director	Eoin	Ó	Broin	explained	the	difficulty	
of	advancing	these	types	of	arguments:15	
We	were	 trying	 to	 say,	 ‘look,	 given	 the	 level	 of	 exposure	 of	 German,	 French	 and	 British	
banks	to	the	 Irish	banking	system	and	given	the	negative	economic,	 financial	and	political	
impact	of	denying	a	member	state	like	Ireland	a	second	bailout	if	it	was	required,	it	would	
not	happen’.	But	you	are	still	asking	people	to	take	a	big	risk	...	we	found	it	very	difficult	to	
counter	that	[Yes	side]	argument.		
	
Michael	Taft,	economist	at	Unite,	similarly	said:	‘Those	arguments	didn't	wash,	understandably.	Nobody	
wanted	 to	 take	 that	 chance’. 16 	Anthony	 Coughlan	 of	 the	 National	 Platform	 agreed:	 ‘There	 were	
technicalities	of	that	kind	which	were	hard	to	explain’.17	
		 As	 such,	 there	was	 no	 credible	 alternative	 to	 the	 ESM	 funding	 in	 the	 campaign,	 and	 this	was	
highly	problematic	given	the	uncertainty	surrounding	the	future	of	the	economy.	Fianna	Fáil	MP	Timmy	
Dooley	 noted:	 ‘Being	 anti-austerity	 is	 not	 a	 policy	 response.	 ...	 They	were	 talking	 against	 it,	 but	 they	
didn't	 have	 a	 concrete	 alternative’.18	Blair	 Horan	 of	 the	 Charter	Group	 said:	 ‘The	No	 side	 didn't	 really	
                                                
12	Interview,	19	May	2015.	He	emphasized	that	this	was	his	personal	perspective	and	not	of	his	organization.	
13	Interview,	21	May	2015.	
14	Interview,	12	May	2015.	
15	Interview,	13	May	2015.	
16	Interview,	21	May	2015.	
17	Interview,	22	May	2015.	
18	Interview,	20	May	2015.	
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have	as	good	a	campaign	because	they	could	never	answer	that	question:	How	could	you	get	the	funds	if	
it	was	rejected?’19		
	 In	addition	to	mentioning	the	pro-treaty	side’s	effective	use	of	fear,	the	campaigners	underlined	
the	narrow	focus	of	the	treaty	as	making	the	anti-treaty	side’s	job	harder.	Put	differently,	this	treaty	was	
not	multidimensional.	The	anti-treaty	camp	simply	lacked	its	usual	members	and	arguments.	In	Ireland,	
neutrality	 organizations	 (PANA)	 and	 pro-life	 Catholic	 groups	 consistently	 campaign	 against	 the	 EU	
treaties.	 They	decided	not	 to	 campaign	 in	 this	 particular	 referendum.	When	asked	about	 the	 reasons	
behind	this	choice,	President	of	PANA	Roger	Cole	said	that	their	focus	was	militarization	and	that	their	
main	 reason	 to	 not	 campaign	 was	 a	 lack	 of	 expertise. 20	Pro-life	 Iona	 Institute	 offered	 the	 same	
reasoning.21	The	fact	that	the	Fiscal	Compact	was	on	a	very	limited	subject	changed	campaign	dynamics.	
Pro-treaty	campaigners	argued	that	this	made	it	easier	for	them	to	campaign	because	it	was	harder	for	
the	anti-treaty	side	to	link	the	proposal	to	a	wide	variety	of	themes	such	as	neutrality	or	moral	issues,	in	
striking	 contrast	 with	 the	 Nice	 and	 Lisbon	 campaigns.	 Labour	 Party	 MP	 Joe	 Costello	 said:	 ‘Previous	
treaties	were	about	a	plethora	of	 issues.	 ...	 This	was	entirely	on	 the	economy.	 ...	 So	 less	easy	 for	 red	
herrings	to	be	introduced,	which	causes	doubt	in	people's	minds...	It	was	easier	for	us	to	be	coherent’.22	
Fianna	 Fáil	MP	 Timmy	Dooley	 agreed:	 ‘It	was	 very	 narrowly	 defined.	 ...	We	weren't	 dealing	with	 the	
Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	...	the	extraneous	arguments	were	not	as	prevalent’.23		
	 To	complement	the	interview	data,	I	conducted	a	content	analysis	of	campaign	statements	(see	
online	 appendix),	 which	 reveals	 similar	 patterns.	 As	 expected,	 the	 pro-treaty	 campaigners	 relied	 on	
keywords	such	as	stability,	foreign	direct	investment	and	responsible	budgeting,	whereas	the	anti-treaty	
campaigners	brought	up	austerity,	property	tax,	and	blamed	the	EU	for	the	poor	economic	conditions.	
Yet,	interestingly,	the	pro-treaty	speakers	used	the	word	‘risk’,	mentioned	‘Greece’	and	brought	up	the	
                                                
19	Interview,	20	May	2015.	
20	Interview,	14	May	2015.	
21	Interview	with	Ben	Conroy,	13	May	2015.	
22	Interview,	13	May	2015.	
23	Interview,	20	May	2015.	
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issue	of	 future	eligibility	 for	European	bailout	 funds,	more	 than	 the	anti-treaty	 side	did.	This	 confirms	
that	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 centred	 their	 campaign	 on	 catastrophic	 consequences,	 particularly	 on	 losing	
access	to	a	major	new	source	of	bailout	 funding	for	 future	crises.	The	anti-treaty	campaigners,	on	the	
other	hand,	used	more	empirical	data	and	referred	to	economists	 in	 their	argumentation.24	This	could	
be	 read	as	a	 reflection	of	 the	anti-treaty	 side’s	difficulty	 in	explaining	why	a	No	vote	would	not	block	
access	 to	 future	 bailout	 funds.	 Nonetheless,	 less	 than	 half	 of	 them	 proposed	 an	 alternative	 funding	
solution	in	relation	to	future	crises,	which	echoes	the	interviewees’	comments	on	the	anti-treaty	side’s	
inability	to	propose	a	credible	alternative.	
	 Looking	 at	 the	 detailed	 data	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact,	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	
campaigners	 perceived	 the	 pro-treaty	 side	 to	 be	 more	 able	 to	 control	 the	 campaign	 agenda	 on	 the	
consequences	of	the	vote	choice.	Although	this	is	a	narrative	observed	in	repeat	referendums	and	that	
the	Fiscal	Compact	is	a	single	referendum,	what	this	case	shares	with	repeat	referendums	is	the	limited	
availability	 of	 arguments	 for	 the	 anti-EU	 campaigners,	 confirming	 the	 importance	 of	 issue	
multidimensionality.	The	Fiscal	Compact	was	on	a	very	specific	theme,	which	limited	the	role	the	usual	
anti-treaty	campaigners	can	play	in	the	debate.		
	
Conclusion	
In	 this	 research,	 I	 seek	 to	 theorize	 agenda	 setting	 in	 referendums	 on	 EU	 treaty	 ratification.	 The	 EU	
referendum	literature,	despite	emphasizing	the	importance	of	campaigns,	 is	silent	on	the	asymmetrical	
advantage	 that	 exists	 in	 referendum	 politics,	 which	 gives	 the	 upper	 hand	 to	 the	 No	 side.	 I	 study	 11	
referendum	 campaigns	 closely	 to	 understand	 whether	 the	 anti-treaty	 side	 mounted	 a	 significant	
campaign	and	use	interview	data	to	observe	the	extent	to	which	campaigners	perceived	an	asymmetrical	
advantage	in	setting	the	agenda	on	the	consequences	of	the	vote	choice,	while	looking	closely	into	the	
political	 setting	 to	control	 for	alternative	explanations.	Empirically	 this	 in-depth	analysis	contributes	 to	
                                                
24	In	this	context,	data	means	outside	sources,	studies	and	surveys.	
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the	 growing	 scholarship	 on	 EU	 referendum	 campaigns	 and	 how	 campaign	 information	 mediates	 the	
extent	to	which	different	aspects	of	the	referendum	proposal	become	salient	in	the	minds	of	voters.	
	 I	 find	 that	 the	 anti-treaty	 campaigners,	 as	 expected,	 enjoy	 a	 political	 advantage	 in	 EU	 treaty	
ratification	 referendums	when	 they	 actively	 participate	 in	 the	 debate.	Nevertheless,	 I	 also	 specify	 the	
underlying	 mechanism	 of	 this	 advantage	 and	 the	 conditions	 in	 which	 this	 advantage	 becomes	
constrained.	The	asymmetrical	advantage	depends	essentially	on	the	availability	of	arguments.	The	more	
multidimensional	the	topic	is,	the	more	campaign	material	the	No	side	has.	When	the	typical	anti-treaty	
campaigners	cannot	advance	their	arguments	either	because	the	guarantees	from	the	EU	removed	their	
themes	 from	 the	 agenda	 (repeat	 referendum)	 or	 because	 the	 treaty	 is	 a	 very	 specific	 one	 (Fiscal	
Compact),	 this	 advantage	 disappears.	 These	 findings	 confirm	 that	 the	 EU	 referendum	 votes	 are	 not	
inherently	 based	 on	 national	 or	 European	 factors,	 as	 the	 second-order	 and	 issue-voting	 approaches	
suggest.	 Instead,	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 national	 or	 European	 factors	 relate	 to	 the	 vote	 depends	 on	
whether	and	how	the	rival	campaigns	bring	them	up.	
	 This	research	speaks	to	the	broader	referendum	literature	as	well.	The	findings	demonstrate	that	
in	EU	referendums,	under	certain	conditions,	the	Yes	side	is	also	able	to	attach	drastic	consequences	to	a	
vote	against	the	proposal	and	play	the	same	game	as	No	campaigners.	The	sample	of	EU	referendums	
under	study	suggests	two	factors.	First,	the	Yes	side	has	increased	chances	to	set	the	agenda	when	the	
No	 side	 is	 restrained.	 Second,	 for	 both	 sides	 the	 availability	 of	 certain	 arguments	 matters.	 In	 the	
interview	 data,	 the	 pro-treaty	 campaigners	 suggest	 that	 they	 control	 the	 agenda	 best	 if	 they	 can	 use	
arguments	on	a	potential	exclusion	from	the	economic	benefits	of	EU	membership	either	because	it	is	a	
second	vote	and	a	second	rejection	is	presented	as	a	rejection	of	the	EU	(repeat	referendum)	or	because	
the	 vote	 is	 tied	 directly	 to	 access	 to	 EU	 bailout	 funds	 (Fiscal	 Compact).	 As	 Billie	 Sparks,	 a	 pro-Lisbon	
campaigner,	put	it:	‘In	the	second	round,	the	Yes	side	played	the	No	side	at	their	own	game.	...	This	time	
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the	messages	were	simpler,	 such	as	“Yes	 for	 jobs”’.25	Ciarán	Toland,	a	pro-Nice	campaigner,	compared	
the	‘jobs’	argument	of	the	Yes	campaign	to	the	‘abortion’	and	‘neutrality’	arguments	of	the	No	campaign,	
in	 that	 they	 both	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 the	 treaty	 in	 question.26	Importantly,	 however,	 the	 Yes	
campaigners	 played	 this	 game	 only	 when	 they	 were	 not	 cornered	 in	 a	 defensive	 campaign	 by	 an	
aggressive	No	side.	Comparative	research	designs	could	 further	 investigate	the	circumstances	 in	which	
the	Yes	side	gains	such	control	 in	different	kinds	of	referendums,	whether	this	happens	only	when	the	
No	side’s	hands	are	tied,	and	the	kinds	of	arguments	they	raise	when	they	do	so.		
	 While	 this	 research	has	 focused	on	agenda	setting	on	negative	consequences	at	 the	aggregate	
level,	 another	 question	 for	 future	 research	 could	 be	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 asymmetrical	
advantage	 in	 referendum	 campaigns	 and	 the	 status	 quo	 bias.	 There	 are	 numerous	 studies	 at	 the	
individual	 level,	which	 show	 that	 individuals	weigh	 losses	 heavier	 than	 gains	 in	making	 decisions	 (e.g.	
Kahneman	&	Tversky,	1979,	1984;	Kam	&	Simas,	2010;	Samuelson	&	Zeckhauser,	1988;	Thaler,	1980).	To	
understand	the	relationship	between	the	No	side’s	advantage	and	a	status	quo	bias,	future	work	could	
study	the	degree	to	which	individuals	respond	to	rival	campaign	arguments	around	‘risk’.	Individuals	are	
shown	to	alter	their	preferences	when	they	hear	different	but	logically	equivalent	descriptions,	e.g.	90%	
employment	 vs.	 10%	 unemployment	 (Tversky	 &	 Kahneman,	 1990),	 responding	 more	 to	 negatively	
presented	 ones.27	Detailed	 data	 linking	 the	 campaign	messages	 to	 individual-level	 change	 in	 attitudes	
would	provide	a	fruitful	research	agenda.	
	 Future	research	should	also	compare	the	political	advantage	and	the	availability	of	arguments	in	
different	kinds	of	referendums.	This	article	studied	votes	on	the	ratification	of	EU	treaties	because	the	
treaty	amendment	referendums	provide	a	particular	kind	of	debate,	which	 is	highly	comparable	across	
                                                
25	Interview,	27	April	2011.	
26	Interview,	11	April	2011.	
27 This	equivalency	 framing	 (Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1990)	 is	different	 from	the	 issue	 framing	 (Chong	&	Druckman,	
2007)	that	I	refer	to	in	this	paper.	Equivalency	framing	involves	casting	the	same	information	in	either	a	positive	or	
negative	 light.	 	 Issue	 framing	 concerns	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 a	 speaker	 might	 shift	 public	 opinion	 by	 emphasizing	
certain	themes	and	deemphasizing	others.	 
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cases.	Nevertheless,	the	findings	could	be	applicable	to	referendums	on	EU	policies	as	well.	For	instance,	
in	the	Swedish	and	Danish	votes	on	the	adoption	of	the	common	currency	Euro,	the	anti-EU	sides	framed	
the	proposals	strategically	to	raise	fundamental	questions	on	the	future	of	Europe	such	as	enlargement,	
social	 welfare	 or	 national	 sovereignty	 (e.g.	 de	 Vreese	 &	 Semetko,	 2004;	 LeDuc,	 2005).	 In	 the	 recent	
Dutch	referendum	on	the	EU-Ukraine	Association	Agreement	too,	the	anti-EU	campaigners	strategically	
moved	 beyond	 the	 proposal	 itself	 (Cleppe,	 2015).	 Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 Ukraine,	 the	 activists	 who	
initiated	 the	 referendum	openly	 acknowledged	 that	 their	 aim	was	 to	 give	 voters	 a	 chance	 to	 express	
their	 frustration	 at	 the	 EU	 (Forsyth,	 2016).	 In	 policy	 referendums,	 like	 in	 treaty	 amendment	 ones,	
campaign	strategies	and	the	ability	to	broaden	the	debate	arguably	play	an	important	role.				
	 Another	important	category	will	likely	be	‘exit’	referendums.	The	Brexit	referendum	was	the	first	
of	this	kind.	Most	people	predicted	the	Remain	side	to	win	precisely	because	of	the	clear	consequences	
of	 leaving	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 potential	 status	 quo	 bias.	 But	 this	 case	 is	 more	 nuanced	 than	 the	 treaty	
ratification	 ones	 because	 there	 was	 no	 clear	 ‘No	 side’,	 and	 the	 campaign	 was	 run	 on	 a	 different	
dichotomy	of	Remain	and	Leave.	Both	campaigns	held	key	advantages	in	the	Brexit	referendum.	First,	in	
terms	 of	 the	 availability	 of	 campaign	 arguments,	 the	 Leave	 side	 could	 bring	 up	 anything	 they	 disliked	
about	the	Union	because	the	referendum	was	not	limited	to	a	single	issue	and	was	about	everything	the	
EU	 implied	 (unlike	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact).	 The	 public’s	 lack	 of	 familiarity	 with	 the	 institutions	 and	
competences	 of	 the	 EU	 has	 arguably	 helped	 the	 anti-EU	 side	 in	 that	 sense,	 as	 the	 interview	 data	
suggests.	 Second,	 in	 terms	of	 the	agenda	 control,	 although	 the	Remain	 side	arguably	had	 the	political	
advantage	of	presenting	Brexit	 as	having	drastic	economic	 consequences	 (a	departure	 from	 the	 status	
quo),	 the	 Leave	 side	 not	 only	 challenged	 these	 economic	 figures	 but	 also	 brought	 up	 different	
consequences	of	remaining	 in	the	EU	(consequences	of	the	continuation	of	the	status	quo),	 suggesting	
that	the	UK	would	lose	control	of	its	immigration	policy.	The	slim	victory	of	the	Leave	side	might	not	be	
surprising	 as	 both	 campaigns	 highlighted	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 the	 vote,	 in	 contrast	with	 the	
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usual	picture	in	EU	treaty	ratification	campaigns	where	one	side	tends	to	collect	them	all.	Although	David	
Cameron	 secured	 a	 deal	 with	 the	 EU	 before	 the	 referendum	 to	 block	 the	 Leave	 side	 from	 advancing	
those	types	of	arguments,	which	could	have	worked	just	as	guarantees	in	repeat	referendums,	this	deal	
was	not	seen	as	a	substantial	one.	The	campaign	ground	 in	a	potential	referendum	on	the	final	 ‘Brexit	
deal’,	after	exit	negotiations,	could	be	very	similar	to	those	in	repeat	referendums.	Going	beyond	the	EU	
referendums,	 independence	 referendums	 have	 important	 similarities	 to	 the	 Brexit	 case	 and	 thereby	
‘exit’	referendums.	The	findings	would	be	applicable	to	these	referendums	as	well,	where	both	pro-	and	
anti-independence	groups	actively	seek	to	define	the	consequences	of	the	vote	choice.		
	 These	 questions	 also	 have	 important	 policy	 implications.	 Dinan	 (2012,	 p.	 95)	 describes	
referendums	as	 ‘a	 lightning-rod	 for	Eurosceptics	and	a	scourge	 for	EU	politicians	and	officials’	because	
Eurosceptics	 can	 easily	manipulate	 them	 and	 they	 are	 ‘notoriously	 difficult	 to	win’.	 This	 article	 sheds	
light	on	the	mechanisms	that	lead	to	such	an	advantage.	Nonetheless,	under	certain	circumstances,	the	
Yes	side	is	able	to	gain	control	of	the	agenda.	If	the	EU	decides	to	draft	more	specific	treaties	outside	of	
the	main	treaty	reform	framework	and	to	attach	concrete	costs	to	referendum	outcomes,	as	they	did	in	
the	 case	 of	 Fiscal	 Compact,	 this	might	 limit	 the	No	 side’s	 hand	 in	 future	 campaigns,	 for	 better	 or	 for	
worse.	Future	referendum	outcomes	will	depend	on	the	content	of	the	proposals	and	the	strategies	used	
by	the	government,	the	rival	campaigns	and	the	EU.		
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	 Campaign	
intensity	
Turnout	 Yes	
vote	
No	vote	
intention	
differential	
Central	themes	of	the	No	side	 Government	
popularity	
(%)	
EU	support	
(%)	
Party	
consensus	
(%)	
Initiator	
Maastricht	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Denmark	I		
1992	
11	 83.1	 49.3	 +23	 Creation	of	a	political	‘Union’	
Loss	of	sovereignty,	citizenship,	currency	
35	 57	 61	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Denmark	II		
1993	
9	 86.5	 56.7	 -10	 The	validity	of	Danish	‘opt-outs’	
	
	45	 61	 61	 	
Nice	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	I		
2001	
4	 34.8	 46.1	 +312	 Loss	of	sovereignty,	power,	social	standards	
Changes	in	laws	on	abortion,	military	
neutrality	
Enlargement	
60	 72	 78	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Ireland	II	
2002	
6	 49.5	 62.9	 +10	 The	validity	of	the	‘guarantees’	
	
30	 78	 68	 	
European	Constitution	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Spain	
2005	
5	 42.3	 76.7	 +13	 Loss	of	social	standards	
Militarization	
Language	recognition	(in	the	regions)	
	
56	 72	 77	 Government	
France	
2005	
12	 69.3	 45.3	 +23	 Loss	of	social	standards	and	public	services	
Enlargement,	Islam,	Turkey’s	EU	membership	
Militarization	
44	 56	 40	 Government	
The	Netherlands	
2005	
8	 62.8	 38.5	 +50	 Loss	of	sovereignty,	power,	social	standards	
Euro	
Enlargement,	Islam,	Turkey’s	EU	membership	
Militarization	
48	 75	 67	 Opposition	
Luxembourg		
2005	
6	 90.41	 56.5	 +26	 Loss	of	social	standards	and	public	services	
Enlargement,	Islam,	Turkey’s	EU	membership	
Militarization	
71	 85	 77	 Government	
Lisbon	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	I		
2008	
8	 53.1	 46.6	 +30	 Loss	of	sovereignty,	power,	social	standards	
Changes	in	laws	on	abortion,	military	
neutrality	and	corporate	tax	rate	
32	 73	 73	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Ireland	II	
2009	
	 59.0	 67.1	 +5	 The	validity	of	the	‘guarantees’	
	
10	 69	 73	 	
Fiscal	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	
2012	
	 50.6	 60.3	 +5	 Negative	effects	of	‘austerity’	policies	
	
23	 63	 61	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Note:	Rejections	in	bold.		1	Luxembourg	has	compulsory	voting.		2	Undecided	not	included.	
Table	1:	Campaign	characteristics	and	political	setting		
	
	
	
	 They	had	an	
‘advantage’	or	
‘easier	job’	
They	used	‘fear’	
or	‘threats’	or	
‘blackmail’	
We	had	an	
‘advantage’	or	
‘easier	job’	
We	used	‘fear’	or	
‘threats’	or	
‘blackmail’	
Maastricht	Treaty	
Denmark	I			
Yes	side		 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Denmark	II	 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
Nice	Treaty	
Ireland	I			 Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	II		 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
European	Constitution	
Spain		 Yes	side	 	 	 	 	No	side	 X	 	 	 	
France		
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
The	Netherlands	
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Luxembourg		
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Lisbon	Treaty	
Ireland	I		
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 X	 	
Ireland	II	 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
Fiscal	Treaty	
Ireland		 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
Note:	Marked	cells	indicate	that	a	majority	of	the	respondents	agreed	with	the	mentioned	statement.	
Table	2:	Interview	data	on	the	perception	of	agenda	setting	on	negative	consequences	of	the	vote	choice	
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ONLINE	APPENDIX	
	
Interview	Questionnaire	
	
1. What	were	the	main	issues/arguments	raised	in	your	campaign	(and	second	campaign	if	a	repeat	
referendum)?	
2. Why	did	you	specifically	choose	these	issues	and	arguments?	
3. Did	your	party/organization	have	a	campaigning	strategy	(and	did	your	party/organization	change	its	
campaign	strategy	in	the	second	referendum	if	a	repeat	referendum)?	
4. How	did	you	organize	your	campaign	(and	was	your	preparation	different	for	the	second	referendum	
if	a	repeat	referendum)?	
5. What	were	the	main	challenges	you	faced	during	your	campaign?	
6. How	well	do	you	think	the	other	side	has	performed?	
7. What	would	you	say	were	the	main	challenges	the	other	side	faced?	
	
Codebook	for	Content	Analysis	
The	 content	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 the	 transcripts	 of	 51	 contributions,	 coming	 from	 social	 partners,	
academics,	economists	and	Irish	MEPs.	24	speakers	recommended	a	No	vote,	while	27	of	them	were	in	
favor	of	the	treaty.	The	analysis	was	conducted	manually.	
	
	 YES	 NO	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘Greece’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘risk’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘stability’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘austerity’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘foreign	investment’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘property	tax’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	bring	up	the	concept	of	increased	austerity?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	blame	the	EU	for	the	current	poor	economic	situation?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	bring	up	the	concept	of	future	bailout	funds?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	bring	up	the	concept	of	responsible	budgeting?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	use	any	data?	
(i.e.	footnotes,	outside	sources,	literature,	studies,	surveys	etc.)	
1	 0	
Does	the	statement	refer	to	economists?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	propose	an	alternative	solution	for	the	governance	of	potential	
future	economic	crises?	
1	 0	
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Figure	A1:	Campaign	posters	in	Lisbon	Treaty	referendums	
(Top	row	first	round,	bottom	row	second	round)	
	
	
Figure	A2:	Campaign	posters	in	the	Fiscal	Compact	referendum	
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SPAIN	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Juan	Fernando	López	Aguilar	(PSOE,	MP,	Minister	of	Justice	and	Interior	Affairs)	
o Juan	Moscoso	del	Prado	Hernández	(PSOE,	MP)	
o Enrique	Baron	Crespo	(PSOE,	MEP,	the	chairman	of	the	Party	of	European	Socialists	
Group	in	the	EP	between	1999	and	2004)	
o Orestes	Suárez	Antón	(PSOE,	International	Secretary)	
o Alejando	Muñoz	Alonso	(PP,	Senator)	
o Ignacio	Cosidó	Gutiérrez	(PP,	MP)	
o Jordi	Xuclà	i	Costa	(CiU,	MP)	
o José	Ramón	Beloki	Guerra	(PNV,	MP)	
o Carles	Llorens	I	Vila	(CDC,	International	Secretary)	
	
No	campaigners	
o José	Manuel	Fernández	Fernández	(IU,	Coordinator	of	the	Parliamentary	Group,	and	
mayor	of	Bustarviejo)	
o Joaquim	Puig	Vilamala	and	Oriol	Duran	Torres	(ERC,	Coordinator,	and	Spokesperson	of	
the	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Marc	Giménez	Villahoz	(ICV,	European	Politics	Coordinator)	
o Mikel	Irujo	Amezaga	(EA,	MEP)	
	
Civil	society	
o Jaime	Pastor	(IU,	ATTAC,	Alternative	Space)	
o Ricardo	Gómez	Muñoz	(ATTAC)	
o Carlos	Girbau	Costa	(Social	Forum,	IU)	
o Luis	González	Reyes	(Ecologists	in	Action)	
o José	Ignacio	Torreblanca	(Senior	Analyst	for	EU	Affairs,	Elcano	Royal	Institute	for	
International	Affairs)	
o Jordi	Vaquer	i	Fanés	(Europe	Programme	Co-ordinator,	CIDOB	Foundation)	
	
FRANCE	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Olivier	Ubéda	(UMP,	Deputy	Director	of	Communications	and	European	Affairs	Delegate)	
o Alain	Bergounioux	(PS,	Secretary	General	of	the	PS	Scientific	Council)	
o Pierre	Kanuty	(PS,	International	and	European	Affairs	Political	Assistant)	
o Patrick	Farbiaz	(The	Greens,	International	Secretary)	
o Isabelle	Sicart	(UDF)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Nicolas	Dupont-Aignan	(UMP,	MP)	
o Jacques	Myard	(UMP,	MP)	
 4 
o Jacques	Généreux	(PS)	
o Francine	Bavay	(The	Greens	Executive	Committee	Member,	and	the	Vice-President	of	
the	Regional	Council	of	Île-de-France)	
o Daniel	Cirera	(PCF,	International	Secretary)	
o Dominique	Touraine	(PCF)	
o Alain	Krivine	(LCR)	
o Catherine	Salagnac	(National	Front)	
	
Civil	society	
o Yves	Salesse	(Co-President	of	Copernic	Foundation,	Conseil	d’État	Member,	Co-initiator	
of	the	Appeal	of	200)	
o Claude	Debons	(General	Workers’	Confederation	CGT,	Co-initiator	of	the	Appeal	of	200)	
o Pierre	Khalfa	(ATTAC,	and	Solidarity	Unity	Democracy)	
o Susan	George	(ATTAC)	
o Aurélie	Trouvé	(ATTAC)	
o Maxime	Combes	(ATTAC)	
o Christophe	Beaudouin	(Secretary	General	of	the	“Group	for	a	Confederation	of	the	
States	of	Europe,”	campaigned	with	the	MPF)	
o Raoul-Marc	Jennar	(Member	of	the	No	Committee)	
o Gaëtane	Ricard-Nihoul	(Secretary	General	of	Notre	Europe)	
	
THE	NETHERLANDS	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Atzo	Nicolaï	(VVD,	MP,	Minister	of	European	Affairs)	
o Jan	Jacob	van	Dijk	(CDA,	MP)	
o Marije	Laffeber	(PvdA,	International	Secretary)	
o Bas	Eickhout	(GreenLeft,	Delegate	in	the	European	Green	Party)	
o Gerben-Jan	Gerbrandy	(D66,	Secretary	of	the	D66	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Michiel	van	Hulten	(Director	of	Foundation	for	a	Better	Europe)	
o Hilde	Laffeber	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	(MFA),	Member	of	the	Yes	Campaign	Team)	
o Delphine	Pronk	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	(MFA),	Head	of	the	EU	Communications	Unit)	
o Marco	Pastors	(Political	Leader	of	the	local	party	Liveable	Rotterdam,	Member	of	the	
City	Council,	and	deputy	mayor	of	Rotterdam)	
o Otto	Ter	Haar	(The	Greens,	International	Secretary)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Harry	van	Bommel	(SP,	MP)	
o Renske	Leijten	(SP,	leader	of	the	ROOD,	SP’s	youth	organization)	
o Hans	van	Heijningen	(SP,	Secretary-General)	
o Esme	Wiegman	(CU,	MP)	
o Mat	Herben	(LPF,	Chairman	of	the	LPF)	
o Alexander	van	Hattem	(Young	Fortuynists,	Youth	Organization	of	the	now	defunct	LPF)	
	
Civil	society	
o Willem	Bos	(President	of	the	ConstitutionNo,	and	ATTAC	Netherlands)	
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o Erik	Wesselius	(ConstitutionNo)	
o Wim	van	de	Donk	(President	of	the	WRR,	Scientific	Council	for	Government	Policy)	
o Monica	Sie	Dhian	Ho	(WRR,	Scientific	Council	for	Government	Policy)	
o Patrick	van	Schie	(Director	of	the	Liberal	think	tank	that	is	related	to	the	VVD)	
	
LUXEMBOURG	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o François	Biltgen	(CSV,	MP,	Chairman	of	the	CSV	and	Minister	of	Labor	and	Employment)	
o Laurent	Mosar	(CSV,	MP)	
o Ben	Fayot	(LSAP,	MP,	President	of	the	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Charles	Goerens	(DP,	MP,	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs)	
o Abbes	Jacoby	(The	Greens,	Secretary	General	of	the	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Dan	Michels	(The	Greens,	Parliamentary	Attaché)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Jacques-Yves	Henckes	(ADR,	MP)	
o Henri	Wehenkel	(The	Left)	
	
Civil	society	
o André	Kremer	(Coordinator	and	Leader	of	the	No	Committee)	
o Pierre	Gramegna	(Director-General	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce)	
o Nico	Clement	(Confederation	of	Independent	Trade	Unions	of	Luxembourg	OGBL)	
o Nico	Wennmacher	(President	of	the	Railways	Trade	Union	FNCTTFEL-Landesverband)	
o Tom	Graas	(Director	of	the	national	RTL	TV	News)	
o Marc	Linster	(Director	of	the	national	RTL	Radio)	
o Anne-Marie	Berny	(ATTAC)	
o Adrien	Thomas	(National	Union	of	Luxembourgish	Students	UNEL)	
o Frédéric	Krier	(National	Union	of	Luxembourgish	Students	UNEL)	
o Alfred	Groff	(Luxembourg	Social	Forum)	
o Jürgen	Stoldt	(Political	communication	expert	and	Editor	of	Forum)	
o Thomas	Rupp	(Organizer	of	the	European	No	Campaign)	
	
DENMARK	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Uffe	Ellemann-Jensen	(Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	1992	and	Leader	of	the	Liberal	Party)	
o Niels	Helveg	Petersen	(Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	1993	and	Social	Liberal	Party	MP)	
o Mogens	Lykketoft	(Social	Democrat	MP)	
o Jacob	Buksti	(Social	Democrat	MP)	
o Charlotte	Antonsen	(Liberal	Party	MP)	
o Jørgen	Ørstrøm	Møller	(State	Secretary,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Holger	K.	Nielsen	(Leader	of	the	Socialist	People’s	Party,	MP)	
o Steen	Gade	(Socialist	People’s	Party	MP)	
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o Søren	Krarup	(Progress	Party)	
o Kenneth	Kristensen	Berth	(Danish	People’s	Party)	
	
Civil	society	
o Ole	Krarup	(President	of	the	People’s	Movement	against	the	EU)	
o Jens-Peter	Bonde	(President	of	the	June	Movement)	
o Erik	Boel	(President	of	the	European	Movement)	
	
	
IRELAND	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Dick	Roche	(Fianna	Fáil,	MP,	Minister	of	European	Affairs)	
o Timmy	Dooley	(Fianna	Fáil,	MP)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o David	Harmon	(Fianna	Fáil,	Director	of	Press	and	Communications)	
o Seán	Dorgan	(Fianna	Fáil,	General	Secretary)	
o Lucinda	Creighton	(Fine	Gael,	MP)	
o Tom	Curran	(Fine	Gael,	General	Secretary)	
o Terry	Murphy	(Fine	Gael,	Dublin	Director)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Joe	Costello	(Labour	Party,	MP)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Thomas	Broughan	(Labour	Party,	MP)	
o Déirdre	de	Búrca	(Green	Party,	MP)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Mary	Lou	McDonald	(Sinn	Féin,	MP)	
o Eoin	Ó'Broin	(Sinn	Féin,	Campaign	Director)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Killian	Forde	(Sinn	Féin,	Director	of	Strategy	in	Lisbon1)	
o Joe	Higgins	(Socialist	Party,	MP)	
o Paul	Murphy	(Socialist	Party,	MP)	
o Padraig	Mannion	(Workers’	Party,	Campaign	Director)	
	
Civil	society	
o Declan	Ganley	(Libertas,	President)	
o Naoise	Nunn	(Libertas,	Executive	Director)	
o John	McGuirk	(Libertas,	Communications	Director)	
o Scott	Schittl	(Cóir,	Campaign	Director)	
o Ben	Conroy	(Iona	Institute)	
o Anthony	Coughlan	(National	Platform,	President)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Peter	Lacey	(People’s	Movement)	
o Roger	Cole	(Peace	and	Neutrality	Alliance,	President)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Brendan	Kiely	(Irish	Alliance	for	Europe,	Chief	Executive)	
o Karen	White	(Irish	Alliance	for	Europe)	
o Pat	Cox	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Campaign	Director)	
o Brendan	Halligan	(Ireland	for	Europe,	National	Campaign	Coordinator)	(2	interviews,	in	
2011	and	2015)	
o Brigid	Laffan	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Chairperson)	
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o Caroline	Erskine	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Communications	Director)	
o Anthony	Brown	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Director	of	Research)	
o Michelle	O’Donnell	Keating	(Women	for	Europe,	Co-founder)	
o Jillian	van	Turnhout	(Ireland	for	Europe)	
o Billie	Sparks	(Women	for	Europe)	
o Blair	Horan	(Charter	Group)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Dan	O’Brien,	(Economist,	Institute	of	International	and	European	Affairs)	
o Michael	Taft	(Economist,	Unite)	
o Andy	Storey	(University	professor	and	No	campaigner)	
o Paul	Hand	(Press	Liaison	Officer	to	the	Parliamentary	Sub-Committee	on	Fiscal	Compact)	
o Ciarán	Toland	(Civil	society	Yes	campaigner	in	the	Nice	Treaty	referendums)	
	
 
	 Campaign	
intensity	
Turnout	 Yes	
vote	
No	vote	
intention	
differential	
Central	themes	of	the	No	side	 Government	
popularity	
(%)	
EU	support	
(%)	
Party	
consensus	
(%)	
Initiator	
Maastricht	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Denmark	I		
1992	
11	 83.1	 49.3	 +23	 Creation	of	a	political	‘Union’	
Loss	of	sovereignty,	citizenship,	currency	
35	 57	 61	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Denmark	II		
1993	
9	 86.5	 56.7	 -10	 The	validity	of	Danish	‘opt-outs’	
	
	45	 61	 61	 	
Nice	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	I		
2001	
4	 34.8	 46.1	 +312	 Loss	of	sovereignty,	power,	social	standards	
Changes	in	laws	on	abortion,	military	
neutrality	
Enlargement	
60	 72	 78	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Ireland	II	
2002	
6	 49.5	 62.9	 +10	 The	validity	of	the	‘guarantees’	
	
30	 78	 68	 	
European	Constitution	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Spain	
2005	
5	 42.3	 76.7	 +13	 Loss	of	social	standards	
Militarization	
Language	recognition	(in	the	regions)	
	
56	 72	 77	 Government	
France	
2005	
12	 69.3	 45.3	 +23	 Loss	of	social	standards	and	public	services	
Enlargement,	Islam,	Turkey’s	EU	membership	
Militarization	
44	 56	 40	 Government	
The	Netherlands	
2005	
8	 62.8	 38.5	 +50	 Loss	of	sovereignty,	power,	social	standards	
Euro	
Enlargement,	Islam,	Turkey’s	EU	membership	
Militarization	
48	 75	 67	 Opposition	
Luxembourg		
2005	
6	 90.41	 56.5	 +26	 Loss	of	social	standards	and	public	services	
Enlargement,	Islam,	Turkey’s	EU	membership	
Militarization	
71	 85	 77	 Government	
Lisbon	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	I		
2008	
8	 53.1	 46.6	 +30	 Loss	of	sovereignty,	power,	social	standards	
Changes	in	laws	on	abortion,	military	
neutrality	and	corporate	tax	rate	
32	 73	 73	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Ireland	II	
2009	
	 59.0	 67.1	 +5	 The	validity	of	the	‘guarantees’	
	
10	 69	 73	 	
Fiscal	Treaty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	
2012	
	 50.6	 60.3	 +5	 Negative	effects	of	‘austerity’	policies	
	
23	 63	 61	 Mandated	
by	the	
constitution	
Note:	Rejections	in	bold.		1	Luxembourg	has	compulsory	voting.		2	Undecided	not	included.	
Table	1:	Campaign	characteristics	and	political	setting		
	
	
	
	 They	had	an	
‘advantage’	or	
‘easier	job’	
They	used	‘fear’	
or	‘threats’	or	
‘blackmail’	
We	had	an	
‘advantage’	or	
‘easier	job’	
We	used	‘fear’	or	
‘threats’	or	
‘blackmail’	
Maastricht	Treaty	
Denmark	I			
Yes	side		 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Denmark	II	 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
Nice	Treaty	
Ireland	I			 Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Ireland	II		 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
European	Constitution	
Spain		 Yes	side	 	 	 	 	No	side	 X	 	 	 	
France		
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
The	Netherlands	
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Luxembourg		
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 	 	
Lisbon	Treaty	
Ireland	I		
Yes	side	 X	 X	 	 	
No	side	 	 	 X	 	
Ireland	II	 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
Fiscal	Treaty	
Ireland		 Yes	side	 	 	 X	 X	
No	side	 X	 X	 	 	
Note:	Marked	cells	indicate	that	a	majority	of	the	respondents	agreed	with	the	mentioned	statement.	
Table	2:	Interview	data	on	the	perception	of	agenda	setting	on	negative	consequences	of	the	vote	choice	
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ONLINE	APPENDIX	
	
Interview	Questionnaire	
	
1. What	were	the	main	issues/arguments	raised	in	your	campaign	(and	second	campaign	if	a	repeat	
referendum)?	
2. Why	did	you	specifically	choose	these	issues	and	arguments?	
3. Did	your	party/organization	have	a	campaigning	strategy	(and	did	your	party/organization	change	its	
campaign	strategy	in	the	second	referendum	if	a	repeat	referendum)?	
4. How	did	you	organize	your	campaign	(and	was	your	preparation	different	for	the	second	referendum	
if	a	repeat	referendum)?	
5. What	were	the	main	challenges	you	faced	during	your	campaign?	
6. How	well	do	you	think	the	other	side	has	performed?	
7. What	would	you	say	were	the	main	challenges	the	other	side	faced?	
	
Codebook	for	Content	Analysis	
The	 content	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 the	 transcripts	 of	 51	 contributions,	 coming	 from	 social	 partners,	
academics,	economists	and	Irish	MEPs.	24	speakers	recommended	a	No	vote,	while	27	of	them	were	in	
favor	of	the	treaty.	The	analysis	was	conducted	manually.	
	
	 YES	 NO	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘Greece’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘risk’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘stability’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘austerity’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘foreign	investment’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	mention	‘property	tax’?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	bring	up	the	concept	of	increased	austerity?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	blame	the	EU	for	the	current	poor	economic	situation?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	bring	up	the	concept	of	future	bailout	funds?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	bring	up	the	concept	of	responsible	budgeting?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	use	any	data?	
(i.e.	footnotes,	outside	sources,	literature,	studies,	surveys	etc.)	
1	 0	
Does	the	statement	refer	to	economists?	 1	 0	
Does	the	statement	propose	an	alternative	solution	for	the	governance	of	potential	
future	economic	crises?	
1	 0	
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Figure	A1:	Campaign	posters	in	Lisbon	Treaty	referendums	
(Top	row	first	round,	bottom	row	second	round)	
	
	
Figure	A2:	Campaign	posters	in	the	Fiscal	Compact	referendum	
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SPAIN	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Juan	Fernando	López	Aguilar	(PSOE,	MP,	Minister	of	Justice	and	Interior	Affairs)	
o Juan	Moscoso	del	Prado	Hernández	(PSOE,	MP)	
o Enrique	Baron	Crespo	(PSOE,	MEP,	the	chairman	of	the	Party	of	European	Socialists	
Group	in	the	EP	between	1999	and	2004)	
o Orestes	Suárez	Antón	(PSOE,	International	Secretary)	
o Alejando	Muñoz	Alonso	(PP,	Senator)	
o Ignacio	Cosidó	Gutiérrez	(PP,	MP)	
o Jordi	Xuclà	i	Costa	(CiU,	MP)	
o José	Ramón	Beloki	Guerra	(PNV,	MP)	
o Carles	Llorens	I	Vila	(CDC,	International	Secretary)	
	
No	campaigners	
o José	Manuel	Fernández	Fernández	(IU,	Coordinator	of	the	Parliamentary	Group,	and	
mayor	of	Bustarviejo)	
o Joaquim	Puig	Vilamala	and	Oriol	Duran	Torres	(ERC,	Coordinator,	and	Spokesperson	of	
the	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Marc	Giménez	Villahoz	(ICV,	European	Politics	Coordinator)	
o Mikel	Irujo	Amezaga	(EA,	MEP)	
	
Civil	society	
o Jaime	Pastor	(IU,	ATTAC,	Alternative	Space)	
o Ricardo	Gómez	Muñoz	(ATTAC)	
o Carlos	Girbau	Costa	(Social	Forum,	IU)	
o Luis	González	Reyes	(Ecologists	in	Action)	
o José	Ignacio	Torreblanca	(Senior	Analyst	for	EU	Affairs,	Elcano	Royal	Institute	for	
International	Affairs)	
o Jordi	Vaquer	i	Fanés	(Europe	Programme	Co-ordinator,	CIDOB	Foundation)	
	
FRANCE	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Olivier	Ubéda	(UMP,	Deputy	Director	of	Communications	and	European	Affairs	Delegate)	
o Alain	Bergounioux	(PS,	Secretary	General	of	the	PS	Scientific	Council)	
o Pierre	Kanuty	(PS,	International	and	European	Affairs	Political	Assistant)	
o Patrick	Farbiaz	(The	Greens,	International	Secretary)	
o Isabelle	Sicart	(UDF)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Nicolas	Dupont-Aignan	(UMP,	MP)	
o Jacques	Myard	(UMP,	MP)	
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o Jacques	Généreux	(PS)	
o Francine	Bavay	(The	Greens	Executive	Committee	Member,	and	the	Vice-President	of	
the	Regional	Council	of	Île-de-France)	
o Daniel	Cirera	(PCF,	International	Secretary)	
o Dominique	Touraine	(PCF)	
o Alain	Krivine	(LCR)	
o Catherine	Salagnac	(National	Front)	
	
Civil	society	
o Yves	Salesse	(Co-President	of	Copernic	Foundation,	Conseil	d’État	Member,	Co-initiator	
of	the	Appeal	of	200)	
o Claude	Debons	(General	Workers’	Confederation	CGT,	Co-initiator	of	the	Appeal	of	200)	
o Pierre	Khalfa	(ATTAC,	and	Solidarity	Unity	Democracy)	
o Susan	George	(ATTAC)	
o Aurélie	Trouvé	(ATTAC)	
o Maxime	Combes	(ATTAC)	
o Christophe	Beaudouin	(Secretary	General	of	the	“Group	for	a	Confederation	of	the	
States	of	Europe,”	campaigned	with	the	MPF)	
o Raoul-Marc	Jennar	(Member	of	the	No	Committee)	
o Gaëtane	Ricard-Nihoul	(Secretary	General	of	Notre	Europe)	
	
THE	NETHERLANDS	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Atzo	Nicolaï	(VVD,	MP,	Minister	of	European	Affairs)	
o Jan	Jacob	van	Dijk	(CDA,	MP)	
o Marije	Laffeber	(PvdA,	International	Secretary)	
o Bas	Eickhout	(GreenLeft,	Delegate	in	the	European	Green	Party)	
o Gerben-Jan	Gerbrandy	(D66,	Secretary	of	the	D66	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Michiel	van	Hulten	(Director	of	Foundation	for	a	Better	Europe)	
o Hilde	Laffeber	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	(MFA),	Member	of	the	Yes	Campaign	Team)	
o Delphine	Pronk	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	(MFA),	Head	of	the	EU	Communications	Unit)	
o Marco	Pastors	(Political	Leader	of	the	local	party	Liveable	Rotterdam,	Member	of	the	
City	Council,	and	deputy	mayor	of	Rotterdam)	
o Otto	Ter	Haar	(The	Greens,	International	Secretary)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Harry	van	Bommel	(SP,	MP)	
o Renske	Leijten	(SP,	leader	of	the	ROOD,	SP’s	youth	organization)	
o Hans	van	Heijningen	(SP,	Secretary-General)	
o Esme	Wiegman	(CU,	MP)	
o Mat	Herben	(LPF,	Chairman	of	the	LPF)	
o Alexander	van	Hattem	(Young	Fortuynists,	Youth	Organization	of	the	now	defunct	LPF)	
	
Civil	society	
o Willem	Bos	(President	of	the	ConstitutionNo,	and	ATTAC	Netherlands)	
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o Erik	Wesselius	(ConstitutionNo)	
o Wim	van	de	Donk	(President	of	the	WRR,	Scientific	Council	for	Government	Policy)	
o Monica	Sie	Dhian	Ho	(WRR,	Scientific	Council	for	Government	Policy)	
o Patrick	van	Schie	(Director	of	the	Liberal	think	tank	that	is	related	to	the	VVD)	
	
LUXEMBOURG	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o François	Biltgen	(CSV,	MP,	Chairman	of	the	CSV	and	Minister	of	Labor	and	Employment)	
o Laurent	Mosar	(CSV,	MP)	
o Ben	Fayot	(LSAP,	MP,	President	of	the	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Charles	Goerens	(DP,	MP,	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs)	
o Abbes	Jacoby	(The	Greens,	Secretary	General	of	the	Parliamentary	Group)	
o Dan	Michels	(The	Greens,	Parliamentary	Attaché)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Jacques-Yves	Henckes	(ADR,	MP)	
o Henri	Wehenkel	(The	Left)	
	
Civil	society	
o André	Kremer	(Coordinator	and	Leader	of	the	No	Committee)	
o Pierre	Gramegna	(Director-General	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce)	
o Nico	Clement	(Confederation	of	Independent	Trade	Unions	of	Luxembourg	OGBL)	
o Nico	Wennmacher	(President	of	the	Railways	Trade	Union	FNCTTFEL-Landesverband)	
o Tom	Graas	(Director	of	the	national	RTL	TV	News)	
o Marc	Linster	(Director	of	the	national	RTL	Radio)	
o Anne-Marie	Berny	(ATTAC)	
o Adrien	Thomas	(National	Union	of	Luxembourgish	Students	UNEL)	
o Frédéric	Krier	(National	Union	of	Luxembourgish	Students	UNEL)	
o Alfred	Groff	(Luxembourg	Social	Forum)	
o Jürgen	Stoldt	(Political	communication	expert	and	Editor	of	Forum)	
o Thomas	Rupp	(Organizer	of	the	European	No	Campaign)	
	
DENMARK	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Uffe	Ellemann-Jensen	(Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	1992	and	Leader	of	the	Liberal	Party)	
o Niels	Helveg	Petersen	(Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	in	1993	and	Social	Liberal	Party	MP)	
o Mogens	Lykketoft	(Social	Democrat	MP)	
o Jacob	Buksti	(Social	Democrat	MP)	
o Charlotte	Antonsen	(Liberal	Party	MP)	
o Jørgen	Ørstrøm	Møller	(State	Secretary,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Holger	K.	Nielsen	(Leader	of	the	Socialist	People’s	Party,	MP)	
o Steen	Gade	(Socialist	People’s	Party	MP)	
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o Søren	Krarup	(Progress	Party)	
o Kenneth	Kristensen	Berth	(Danish	People’s	Party)	
	
Civil	society	
o Ole	Krarup	(President	of	the	People’s	Movement	against	the	EU)	
o Jens-Peter	Bonde	(President	of	the	June	Movement)	
o Erik	Boel	(President	of	the	European	Movement)	
	
	
IRELAND	
Political	parties	
Yes	campaigners	
o Dick	Roche	(Fianna	Fáil,	MP,	Minister	of	European	Affairs)	
o Timmy	Dooley	(Fianna	Fáil,	MP)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o David	Harmon	(Fianna	Fáil,	Director	of	Press	and	Communications)	
o Seán	Dorgan	(Fianna	Fáil,	General	Secretary)	
o Lucinda	Creighton	(Fine	Gael,	MP)	
o Tom	Curran	(Fine	Gael,	General	Secretary)	
o Terry	Murphy	(Fine	Gael,	Dublin	Director)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Joe	Costello	(Labour	Party,	MP)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Thomas	Broughan	(Labour	Party,	MP)	
o Déirdre	de	Búrca	(Green	Party,	MP)	
	
No	campaigners	
o Mary	Lou	McDonald	(Sinn	Féin,	MP)	
o Eoin	Ó'Broin	(Sinn	Féin,	Campaign	Director)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Killian	Forde	(Sinn	Féin,	Director	of	Strategy	in	Lisbon1)	
o Joe	Higgins	(Socialist	Party,	MP)	
o Paul	Murphy	(Socialist	Party,	MP)	
o Padraig	Mannion	(Workers’	Party,	Campaign	Director)	
	
Civil	society	
o Declan	Ganley	(Libertas,	President)	
o Naoise	Nunn	(Libertas,	Executive	Director)	
o John	McGuirk	(Libertas,	Communications	Director)	
o Scott	Schittl	(Cóir,	Campaign	Director)	
o Ben	Conroy	(Iona	Institute)	
o Anthony	Coughlan	(National	Platform,	President)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Peter	Lacey	(People’s	Movement)	
o Roger	Cole	(Peace	and	Neutrality	Alliance,	President)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Brendan	Kiely	(Irish	Alliance	for	Europe,	Chief	Executive)	
o Karen	White	(Irish	Alliance	for	Europe)	
o Pat	Cox	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Campaign	Director)	
o Brendan	Halligan	(Ireland	for	Europe,	National	Campaign	Coordinator)	(2	interviews,	in	
2011	and	2015)	
o Brigid	Laffan	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Chairperson)	
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o Caroline	Erskine	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Communications	Director)	
o Anthony	Brown	(Ireland	for	Europe,	Director	of	Research)	
o Michelle	O’Donnell	Keating	(Women	for	Europe,	Co-founder)	
o Jillian	van	Turnhout	(Ireland	for	Europe)	
o Billie	Sparks	(Women	for	Europe)	
o Blair	Horan	(Charter	Group)	(2	interviews,	in	2011	and	2015)	
o Dan	O’Brien,	(Economist,	Institute	of	International	and	European	Affairs)	
o Michael	Taft	(Economist,	Unite)	
o Andy	Storey	(University	professor	and	No	campaigner)	
o Paul	Hand	(Press	Liaison	Officer	to	the	Parliamentary	Sub-Committee	on	Fiscal	Compact)	
o Ciarán	Toland	(Civil	society	Yes	campaigner	in	the	Nice	Treaty	referendums)	
	
 
